Evolving Structural Patterns in the Enlarging European Division of Labour: Sectoral and Branch Specialisation and the Potentials for Closing the Productivity Gap by Dr Johannes Stephan
5/2003
Sonderheft
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle – IWH
Hausanschrift: Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale)
Postfachanschrift: PF 110361, 06017 Halle (Saale)
Telefon: (0345) 7753-60, Telefax: (0345) 7753820
Internet: http://www.iwh-halle.de
ISBN 3-930963-76-0
Evolving Structural Patterns in the
Enlarging European Division of Labour:
Sectoral and Branch Specialisation
















Evolving Structural Patterns  
in the Enlarging European Division of Labour:  
Sectoral and Branch Specialisation  
and the Potentials for Closing the Productivity Gap 
by 














Final research report of workpackage WP1 of an EU funded RTD-project in the 5
th 
Framework Programme 
Research project “EU Integration and the Prospects for Catch-Up Development in CEECs - 
The Determinants of the Productivity Gap”. 
This research has been partially financed by the EU Commission, in the Key Action on 
Improving the Socio-economic Knowledge Base, contract no HPSE-CT-2001-00065. The 
author is solely responsible for the contents which might not represent the opinion of the 
Community. The Community is not responsible for any use that might be made of data ap-
pearing in this publication. 
 
 
Keywords:  Integration, catch-up development, specialisation, structural change, sec-
tors, industrial branches, structural adjustment, labour productivity, pro-
ductivity gap, productivity growth 
 








INSTITUT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSFORSCHUNG HALLE - IWH 
Hausanschrift: Kleine Märkerstraße 8, 06108 Halle (Saale) 
Postanschrift. Postfach 11 03 61, 06017 Halle (Saale) 
Telefon:    (0345) 77 53-60 
Telefax:    (0345) 77 53-8 20 
Internetadresse: http://www.iwh-halle.de 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten 
Druck bei Druckhaus Schütze GmbH, 
Fiete-Schultze-Str. 6, 06116 Halle (Saale) 






The formerly socialist countries in Central East Europe strive to close the development 
gap between their economies and those of the countries in West Europe. Their main 
vehicles in support of catch-up development featured the internal and external liberali-
sation of markets. 
Internal liberalisation was geared towards replacing the system of economic planning 
with the governance of markets and external liberalisation aimed at integration into the 
World market in general and the European market in particular. European integration 
itself was coined to serve as an engine for economic development: market access, effi-
cient allocation of resources in the international division of labour, and access to more 
advanced technology were perceived to be the main drivers. The political instrument 
in support of this is the prospected European Union membership. In fact, a selection of 
Central East European countries have been admitted and will become full members in 
April 2004. 
Today, slightly more than one decade after the outset of systemic transition, most of 
those countries are widely considered ‘functioning market-economies’. Their markets 
are well integrated into the European economic area, in as much as foreign trade had 
been liberalised gradually since the early 1990s and fully-fletched currency converti-
bility allows trade on the respective capital and foreign exchange markets in East and 
West. The notable exception, however, remains the labour markets: here political con-
cerns of absorptive capacities in the West still postpone integration. 
With product markets near to full integration, the economies have undergone a pro-
found process of structural change. The pattern of international specialisation which 
has emerged as a result of sectoral change in a selection of Central East European 
economies is the focus of the research presented here. The main objective of research 
was to determine the patterns as they have evolved over time, and to assess the pros-
pects of catching up derived from those sectoral patterns. 
This publication reports research and the results of one of the workpackages in a larger 
international cooperative research project, financed by the EU in its 5
th Framework 
Programme: EU Integration and the Prospects for Catch-Up Development in CEECs - 
The Determinants of the Productivity Gap (HPSE-CT-2001-00065). This project is 
coordinated by the author of this report at the IWH. Whereas research in this work-
package is concluded with this report, other workpackages will continue to assess fur-
ther determinants until late summer 2004, when the project formally ends. All research 
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The research project, in the framework of which this workpackage forms part, aims to 
enquire into the determinants of the productivity gaps between the average EU-15-
levels and the levels of individual CEECs, namely in geographical order Estonia, Po-
land, The Czech and Slovak Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. 
All those countries exhibit levels of GDP per capita well below the EU-15 average. 
All countries will hence most probably qualify for cohesion fund policies (< 90%) and 
most regions will probably meet the eligibility-criteria for EU structural fund policies 
(<75%). Regions above this threshold include today the ones around Prague, Bratisla-
va and Budapest. Amongst the economic objective of their integration is prominently 
their catching up to the higher levels of economic development predominant in the EU. 
Productivity levels as a measure for levels of economic development provide a slightly 
different picture from the one presented by GDP per capita.1 In particular, differences 
arise with labour participation rates: e. g. the higher the unemployment rates, the 
greater the level differences between GDP per capita and national productivities. Iden-
tification of sources of lower levels of economic development in candidate countries, 
and quantification of their respective weights in explaining development gaps are nec-
essary pre-requisites for the targeting of economic policy in the framework of EU co-
hesion policies. Hence, analysis focuses on the determinants of productivity growth 
and levels: knowledge about the relative roles played by individual determinants as 
well as analysis of the determinants themselves can highlight deficiencies hampering 
swift real economy catch up. 
Assuming that deepening integration with the West and eventual EU membership does 
not necessarily have to lead to complete economic convergence in all accession coun-
tries, the aim of this research is to determine, from the viewpoint of economic struc-
tures, the prospects of economic catch-up for a selection of accession countries. The 
generated insights can then be used to assess the scope for economic policy to assist 
improving the conditions for economic development. This is not to deny that integra-
tion generally is a necessary condition for catch-up development in transitional CEECs 
via technology transfer and efficiency-improving participation in intra-industrial trade 
and/or specialisation. Rather, integration might prove to be insufficient. In its latest re-
port on economic cohesion, the EU Commission takes the opinion that sectoral struc-
                                                 
1  For empirical reasons, this paper focuses on labour productivity only and disregards the productiv-
ities of other factors of production, as e. g. capital. Moreover, the most profound modernisation of 
capital stock is still under way, making year-on-year comparisons difficult. This is not to neglect 
that an analysis of capital productivity and total factor productivity could lead to slightly different 
results and that such will gain more importance with transition countries reaching higher levels of 




tures in candidate countries will prove to be decisive in a process of real economy 
convergence (EU 2001b, pp. 37-41). The report suggests to target EU cohesion poli-
cies towards the intermediate aim of structural change. 
Amongst the most prominent effects of integration between unequal partners are the 
structural adjustments guided by the new pattern of respective competitive advantages, 
and the technological catch-up process via technology transfer. The aim of workpack-
age 1 in this project is to identify the structural determinant of productivity gaps. To 
this end, research focussed in the first instance on the identification and analysis of de-
terminants of aggregate, average economy-wide (national) productivity gaps. In a sec-
ond step, the determinants of aggregate productivity growth have been assessed. This 
led research to focus on productivity determinants within manufacturing industry. The 
research report on this workpackage closes with a projection of future industrial pro-
ductivity growth potentials in each of the candidate countries assessed. 
A few words on connotations, concepts and data availability: productivity, the central 
explanans of this research, is precisely ‘apparent value added labour productivity’, de-
fined by value added per employment. Productivity, as will be referred to it in the text, 
is not corrected by the intensity of use of the factor labour (as e. g. hours worked by 
employment), as comparable data was not available to establish e. g. the total hours 
worked. 
The structural entities of the economy at the highest level of aggregation are denoted 
‘broad sectors’ and include the six broad sectors of agriculture (NACE: A+B), indus-
try (NACE: C+D+E), construction (NACE: F), household-related services (NACE: 
G+H+I), enterprise-related services (NACE: J+K), and finally the state-administration 
sectors (NACE: L+M+N+O, and where available: P). For the average of the EU-15, 
including all weighted 15 current member states, broad sectors were the only level of 
aggregation for which comparative data was available from EUROSTAT. Some of the 
missing data was complemented by OECD and official national statistics. The level 
below that aggregation consists of ‘sectors’ and includes the 15 one-digit NACE sec-
tors of A-O. For the group of the accession states, data on value added and employ-
ment at this level of aggregation was readily available from national statistics and the 
WIIW database. Comparisons between accession states and the EU were only possible 
for some EU member states, and not even the complete group of the largest EU coun-
tries or the core-EU. Comparative analysis was hence conducted between accession 
states and Germany. 
Within the sector of manufacturing, analysis was conducted at two different levels of 
aggregation: wherever productivity levels at the industrial branch level were required, 
analysis used the higher level of aggregation including the 13 double-digit NACE 
manufacturing branches of DA-DN (with DF and DG in one group). Where only sha-
res of branches within total manufacturing were needed (either measured in terms of 




ches at the 3 digit NACE level of 151-372. In the case of Estonia and Poland, such di-
saggregated data was not available and had to be estimated by use of 2-digit NACE 
data from EUROSTAT and (incomplete) data from national statistical offices at lower 
levels of aggregation. 
1.  Determinants of the National Productivity Gap 
1.1  Setting the agenda: the sizes of productivity gaps 
Within the past decade, national levels of labour productivity in CEECs have con-
verged significantly towards the levels predominant in the EU. Yet, levels are still 
significantly lower, large gaps are still prevalent. Needless to say, levels within the EU 
also differ greatly; comparisons with the EU as an economic area use the weighted  
average of all current 15 EU member states. 
Table 1 reports levels in 1000 € for the year 2000, calculated by use of annual average 
market exchange rates as well as PPP-corrected exchange rates (shaded columns).2 In 
2000, three groups of countries amongst CEECs with similar productivity levels can 
be identified: Estonia and Poland rank in a lowest productivity group, the Slovak and 
Czech Republics as well as Hungary in a second and Slovenia sticks out as the country 
with the highest productivity level. At the outset of economic transformation and in-
tegration into western markets, productivity levels were not only much lower but also 
more diverse. Slovenia had always achieved higher productivity levels even during its 
socialist era; the gap to its fellow accession candidates has even further increased. 
Throughout the 1990s, productivity levels of Hungary and the Czech Republic were 
more or less the same, albeit Hungary growing at a slightly faster rate. Ever since the 
break-up of the CSFR remained the Slovak Republic’s productivity level slightly lo-
wer than the ones of the Czech Republic and Hungary. Estonia started from a low le-
vel but managed to overtake Poland in 1997. 
All transition economies in our sample exhibit sizeable productivity gaps vis-à-vis the 
EU-average and most of the 15 European economies (last row of the table). All of 
them have already surpassed Portugal, the EU member country with the lowest na-
tional productivity level. Only three, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, com-
                                                 
2  All countries reported have lower living expenses than the EU-15 average (measured in terms of 




mand higher levels than Greece, the second but weakest EU member country. By 
2000, the Slovak Republic nearly caught up with Greece. In comparison to the average 
EU-15 level in end 2000, Slovenia reaches nearly 80%, Hungary, the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics around 60% and Poland and Estonia still less than 50%. 
Table 1: 
Productivity levels in selected EU-countries and CEECs, in 2000 
  Market exchange rates  PPP-exchange rates 
 in  1000  € per employment    in % of EU-15 
EU-15 42.5 42.5  100.0 
Portugal 10.0  15.4  36.1 
Greece 19.4 25.0  58.8 
Spain 26.1  31.9  74.9 
Estonia 8.3 20.5  48.2 
Poland 9.3  19.7  46.3 
Czech Republic  10.9  26.7  62.7 
Slovak Republic  9.2  24.9  58.6 
Hungary 11.1  26.0  61.1 
Slovenia 21.3  32.7  76.9 
Note: Aggregate, economy-wide productivity levels calculated as aggregate value added per employment. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
Of particular interest is the comparison of CEECs with East Germany. In effect also a 
transition economy, East Germany was integrated into the ESM and the currency-area 
of the West German DM already in 1990. Moreover, East Germany was integrated in-
to the German Länderfinanzausgleich, a system of re-distribution of revenues to sup-
port weaker Länder on the cost of more prosperous ones. The region therefore gained 
access to a stable currency, a stable institutional framework and vast financial resour-
ces for investment and restructuring, all of which was not available in fellow transition 
countries. By 1999, the last year for which data on the region is available, East Ger-
many had already reached a level of slightly more than 99% of the EU-15 average in 
PPP-terms. This level is by far higher as compared to any of the CEECs of this analysis. 
1.2  The shares of sectoral differences in productivity gaps 
Sectoral structures play a relevant role during economic catch-up development via in-
tegration: the pattern of sectoral structures can explain some of the lower levels of 




means that even in case of complete catch up of development levels within each sec-
tor, the whole economy as an aggregate can still sustain a gap, if structures favour sec-
tors with typically lower levels of productivity. This can limit the scope for complete 
catch-up: as integration deepens, technology and skills in CEECs will improve and 
possibly even catch up completely (technology transfer), institutions will be reformed 
to match the ones in the EU (via the acquis communautaire), but the development of 
sectoral structures is less clearly determined. 
From the viewpoint of integration and development theories, sectoral structures can be 
thought of as being determined either by country-specific factors or by the level of 
economic development. In the first, resource-based view, sectoral structures between 
integrating partners will correspond to the country’s own competitive strengths, re-
gardless of the maturity of the economy. Both Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin assume 
that structural patterns are determined by comparative advantages. In as much as those 
comparative advantages are stable over time, sectoral structures will also remain un-
changed, that is after the adjustment process induced by intensifying integration is 
complete. 
The second approach belongs to the family of development-ladder theories: here, sec-
toral patterns change in the course of time. They correspond to the country’s level of 
economic development, i. e. there exists a typical sectoral structure for every stage of 
economic development. In the course of economic development, employment will 
shift away from low-income agricultural sectors and gradually move into industry. 
With the economy maturing, renewed shifts will increase the share of the service sec-
tors at the expense of again agriculture and now also industry (Chenery-Hypothesis). 
Sector-specific income-elasticities of demand are the driving forces here. 
Both those concepts are essentially long-term and hence beyond the scope of this re-
search. For the purpose of the analysis here, experiences from other European econo-
mies were used: sectoral structures can differ regardless of the level of economic deve-
lopment. For the CEECs, this means that sectoral structures might exhibit hysteresis, 
and some of the following analysis will make use of this assumption. 
The most important features of patterns of sectoral structures in the selection of acces-
sion candidates as compared to the patterns predominant in the EU are presented in 
Table 2. Most notably, the share of the service sectors (NACE: G-K) and in particular 
in enterprise-related services (NACE: J+K) are much smaller than the corresponding 
sectors in the average EU-15. Furthermore, the industrial sectors (NACE: C+D+E) of 
mainly the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia, and to a lesser extent in Hunga-
ry and Estonia, are much larger as compared to the EU. 
Contrary to common belief, agricultural sectors (NACE: A+B) are in general not much 
larger in accession candidates, with the notable exception of Poland. This, however, 




ment share (amounting to even more than 28% at the end of 2000).3 Furthermore, the 
sector of state administration, education and social services employ much larger shares 
in most accession candidates as compared to the countries in the EU. Only in the cases 
of the Slovak Republic and Hungary are the differences negligible. 
Table 2: 
Patterns of sectoral structures in selected CEECs as compared to the pattern in the  
average EU-15, in 2000 




Estonia  2.4  6.1 0.1  0.4  -6.0  -3.1 9.4 
Poland  23.7 0.4 -1.4  -6.6 -6.9 -9.2 27.2 
Czech Republic  -0.1  9.9  2.5  -2.5  -6.6  -3.5  12.9 
Slovak Republic  -1.9  9.0  1.2  -3.5  -8.2  -0.4  12.9 
Hungary  1.7  6.5 0.2  -1.3  -6.8  -0.4 9.7 
Slovenia 0.8  11.3  1.1  -3.0  -5.3  -5.1  13.9 
Note: Differences to the average EU-15 of employment shares in percentage points. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
What is the extent to which the productivity gaps of individual CEECs today root in 
their respective sectoral patterns? The analysis was conducted at a NACE one-digit le-
vel, including some 15 sectors (NACE A-O). The data source is EUROSTAT. Due to 
non-availability of data for some important European countries even at this highly ag-
gregated level, Germany rather than the EU-15 average has been used as comparative 
country.4 The period of analysis was chosen to start in 1993, when the most intense 
structural breaks due to transformational recession have already been absorbed and 
sectoral structures are since determined by more stable markets. The most recent data 
available are from the year of 2000. 
                                                 
3  Employment data in official Polish statistics distinguish less clearly between former occupation of 
unemployed persons and mere ownership of agricultural land. Already during the socialist era, a 
large share of agricultural land was owned privately. In particular during transformational reces-
sion and its sharp decline of industrial employment, many former industrial workers, having been 
laid off, tried to make a living by way of subsistence farming. In other transition economies, un-
employed workers with an industrial employment history do not enter agricultural employment sta-
tistics. 
4  In an earlier attempt, this analysis was conducted on a still broader economic sector level including 
only 6 sectors for which aggregate EU-15 data was available. In fact, the results are not very diffe-




The empirical method used is very simple. The average, national productivity level π 
of a country is defined as the sum of each product of sectoral productivity levels π 
i 
and employment shares α of sectors i: 
() ∑ =
i
i i α π π  (1) 
The productivity gap between an individual country in CEE and the German level 





















π /  (2) 
The sectorally determined productivity gap 
Sectoral
D CEE / π  can be quantified by comparing 
the actually observed productivity gap with a hypothetical gap which would emerge, if 
sectoral patterns between CEECs and Germany would be equal (note the use of Ger-
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π / ˆ  (4) 
To allow cross-country comparison, this sectoral productivity gap is then related to the 
total of the observed productivity gap to denote the percentage share of the sectoral 
content in the national productivity gap. Chart 1 depicts those sectoral contents of pro-
ductivity gaps in observed total productivity gaps in 1993 and 2000, i. e. the extend to 
which the national productivity gaps are rooted in the respective patterns of specialisa-
tion. 
The explanatory power of the sectoral structure for the size of the productivity gap is 
very different amongst the selection of transition economies and between the two 
years of observation: had the Slovak Republic had the same sectoral employment pat-
tern as the economy of Germany in end 2000, then the productivity gap would have 
turned out to be much smaller. A share of some 17.3% of the observed productivity 
gap in fact roots in the country’s particular sectoral structures if compared to the ones 
                                                 
5  This is not to imply structural convergence in a normative manner of methodology. Rather, this 





prevailing in a more mature European economy, e. g. in Germany. The productivity 
gap vis-à-vis Germany amounted to some 46.3%, of which 8 percentage points can be 
explained by differing sectoral structures only. The growth of the sectoral content be-
tween 1993 and 2000 in the Slovak Republic is a result of rather unfortunate employ-
ment shifts: sectors with above-average productivity levels have experienced little 
(e. g. enterprise-related services) or even negative growth (e. g. industry) in employ-
ment shares, against positive growth (e. g. public administration) in below-average 
productivity sectors. 
Chart 1: 
Sectoral contents of the national productivity gaps of CEECs, in 1993 and 2000 




   Estonia             Poland        Czech Rep.     Slovak Rep.    Hungary         Slovenia 
  2.1                  24.3                8.0                 17.3                15.1                10.5 
  3.0               14.9                   9.6                 12.5                 19.7                 8.9 
 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
The results for Slovenia are comparable to the ones for the Slovak Republic, albeit 
here, the sectoral content only amounted to some 10.5% of the observed productivity 
gap in 2000. In the case of Hungary, the sectoral content is larger as compared to the 
one in Slovenia (15.1%), but has on the contrary been on the decline during the period 
of analysis. This is mainly due to a pronounced rise in employment shares of enterpri-
se-related services. The sectoral structures prevailing in the Czech Republic do ac-
count for some of the observed productivity gaps, but the indicator remains rather 
small with 8.0% of the national productivity gap. This result incidentally corresponds 
to the sectoral content of the productivity gap between East and West Germany in 
1999, conducted in another analysis using a comparable method (IWH, 2001, p. 183). 
In Estonia, differences in sectoral patterns result in a rather negligible sectoral content 
of some 2.1% in 2000. 
In the case of Poland, the results have to be interpreted with particular caution, due to 




riculture sector. When assuming an agricultural employment share comparable to the 
methodology applied in other transition economies, i. e. a much lower share yet still 
significantly higher than in other transition economies, then the sectoral content would 
become negligible. Poland would then compare with Estonia. The high sectoral con-
tent therefore is driven overwhelmingly by the large employment share in the agricul-
tural sector. 
What are the main driving sources of the sectoral contents in the other countries?6 In 
the Slovak Republic, the sectors of real estate, renting and business activities in enter-
prise-related services, and the manufacturing sector proved to be the most important 
sources of the sectoral content. Whereas enterprise-related services are underrepre-
sented in the Slovak Republic, manufacturing industries employ a higher share as 
compared to Germany. In particular, enterprise-related services have exceptionally 
high levels of sector-specific productivities: on average, they exhibit a level of produc-
tivity of nearly 4 times the national average in the Slovak Republic. In the case of 
Hungary, the high value of the sectoral determinant of the productivity gap can be ex-
plained by, again a comparatively lower employment share in enterprise-related ser-
vices, and additionally much higher employment shares in the agricultural sector. This 
sector typically exhibits well below-average productivities. Whereas the sources of the 
sectoral content in Slovenia can be traced back mainly to higher employment shares in 
manufacturing, the results for the Czech Republic also point to enterprise-related ser-
vices, preceded only by manufacturing. When abstracting from the agricultural role in 
explaining the sectoral contents in Poland, it is again the sector of enterprise-related 
services to drive the Polish result. 
Returning to the theories pertaining to structures and development briefly sketched 
above may guide us to deduct from those results some idea on the future prospects of 
individual CEECs to catch up. In a resource-based world with some degree of hystere-
sis in sectoral structures, where sectoral structures reflect comparative advantages, we 
should expect countries with large or increasing sectoral contents to experience some 
form of an upper limit to the process of catching up: complete productivity conver-
gence is inconceivable even after catch-up of all other determinants of lower levels of 
productivity (methodologically: after sector-specific productivity levels have caught 
up completely), if the economy has above-average shares in sectors which typically 
have below-average levels of productivities. This can be thought of as a purely statisti-
cal effect of averaging. The effect might become relevant foremost in the cases of the 
Slovak Republic and possibly Slovenia, which not only share a significant sectoral 
content of their productivity gaps but also experienced a rise in their sectoral contents 
between 1993 and 2000. Given the high level of unemployment in the Slovak Repub-
                                                 
6  To account for the most important sectors driving the results above, a simple variation analysis was 
conducted. Each NACE sector was assigned a percentage value as weight in explaining the results 




lic, the country might sustain an even larger gap in per capita income. In the case of 
Hungary, the sectoral content is large, yet contrary to the above-mentioned countries, 
experienced a decline. Hence prospects for complete catching up of productivity levels 
are slightly better here. This is even more true for the Czech Republic, where a still 
smaller sectoral content has also become smaller in the period of analysis. The most 
optimistic view can be deducted from the analysis for Estonia, where the content has 
become negligible. 
It is impossible to quantify the limit to productivity catch-up as effected by sectoral 
structures, as relative prices will change in the process. A sufficient magnitude of 
change in prices to let national productivities fully converge, as predicted by the fac-
tor-price equalisation theorem in the Heckscher-Ohlin concept, however, is not to be 
expected: empirically, we can observe that sectors constantly share typical sector-
specific productivity levels across countries even in the highly integrated European re-
gion. 
The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
Estonia’s sectoral structures differ from the ones in the average EU-15, but the 
differences are comparatively low. They feature much higher weights in industry 
and in agriculture, whilst shares in enterprise-related services are much lower in 
Estonia. The country does not appear to be in danger of getting subjected to a 
limit to real economy catch-up effected by the country’s sectoral patterns. 
An interpretation of results at the sectoral level for Poland is difficult. Still, the 
share of employment in state-administration, education and social services ap-
pear to be much smaller than in the average EU-15. The country’s sectoral pat-
terns only seem to potentially restrict real convergence if the distortional large 
employment share in the agricultural sector is taken for granted. Here, the secto-
ral productivity level is extremely low, compared to other Polish sectors. 
The Czech Republic’s sectoral structures show the largest differences as com-
pared to the EU-15 (that is following to Poland). They differ mainly in that in-
dustry is much larger at the expense of enterprise-related services. The country’s 
prospects for complete productivity catch-up can be evaluated positively, as lar-
ger employment shares coincide with above-average sectoral productivity levels. 
In the Slovak Republic, structural differences at the sectoral level are nearly as 
large as in the Czech Republic. This is due mainly to particularly low employ-
ment shares in enterprise-related services and much higher ones in industry. The 
distribution of the country’s sectoral shares and sector-specific productivity le-
vels give rise to a rather pessimistic view on the prospects for complete produc-




Hungary’s sectoral structures compare much better to the ones in the EU. How-
ever, the high sector-specific productivity levels in enterprise-related services 
and low employment shares in the same sector, as well as the opposite pattern in 
industry give rise to a slightly less optimistic assessment. Yet trends in the past 
clearly serve to improve prospects. 
Slovenia’s sectoral patterns are closest to the ones in the EU amongst the coun-
tries assessed here. Never-the-less, the analysis suggests a slightly pessimistic 
view on Slovenia’s prospects for a complete closure of the national productivity 
gap. This is driven mainly by below-average productivity levels in the manufac-
turing sector and above-average productivity levels in enterprise-related servi-
ces. 
1.3  The role of individual sectors in explaining national  
productivity gaps 
So far, sectoral analysis was concerned with the sectoral content of the productivity 
gap across the whole economy. That is, analysis was mainly concerned with sectoral 
specialisation patterns and their influence on productivity gaps and the prospects of 
their closure. In the following, analysis focuses on productivity gaps at the sectoral le-
vel and the role that individual sectors play in explaining the national productivity gap. 
If CEECs apply in general less sophisticated technology in production, then one can 
expect that comparative sectors in CEECs exhibit lower levels of productivities than in 
the more advanced EU countries, and the EU average. Hereby, the largest gaps across 
all CEECs in comparison to the average EU-15 levels typically emerge in industrial 
sectors (see Chart 2: NACE: C+D+E). 
Whilst the data suggest that the gaps are lowest amongst the group of service indus-
tries (NACE: G-K), this needs to be treated with due care: with prices and hence out-
put values typically determined administratively here, productivity levels are not cal-
culated but rather estimated directly (the calculation of value added in services typi-
cally assumes a given level of productivity). Large gaps also exist for the construction 
industry (NACE: F), however, this sector is rather small. 
Sectoral productivity gaps are not only significantly different in size in every econ-
omy. In terms of their respective role in explaining their country’s national productivi-
ty gap, their relative weights within each economy assessed is an important determi-
nant. This is calculated below at a NACE one-digit level. Again, due to data restric-







Productivity levels in CEECs and the EU-15 average, in 2000 
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Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
Individual sectoral productivity gaps are defined according to the same method as the 
national productivity gaps (from formula 2). In order to provide a quantitative account 
of the role played by each sector in determining the national productivity gap, our ana-












α π ∗ = ∗ /  (5) 
To allow cross-country comparison, this indicator is then related to sum of all sectoral 
indicators to exhibit the relative explanatory power of sector i in explaining the na-





























π  (6) 
Table 3 provides an account of explanatory powers of individual sectors as a source of 
national productivity gaps for the selection of CEECs at the end of the year 2000. The 
most obvious result of this analysis is that in all transformation economies assessed, 
the sector of manufacturing (NACE: D) is mainly responsible for national productivity 
gaps: this sector exhibits the highest values of the indicator (solely in the case of Po-




ductivity gap7). This is owed to in particular the typically highest productivity gap 
amongst all sectors in combination its their high relative weight in the economies. 
Table 3: 
Ranking of most influential sectors as a source of the productivity gap, in 2000 
Estonia   Poland    Czech  Republic 
Sector  i π~
   Sector  i π~
   Sector  i π~
 
D 28.5    A  32.6    D  35.6 
G 9.6    D  18.6    F  9.7 
M 9.6    G  11.8    M  9.3 
Sum 3 sectors  47.7    Sum 3 sectors  62.5    Sum 3 sectors  54.6 
 
Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
Sector  i π~    Sector  i π~    Sector  i π~  
D 30.9    D  29.5    D  53.3 
N 12.3    M  11.4    K  13.7 
F 10.9    G  11.4    G  8.9 
Sum 3 sectors  54.1    Sum 3 sectors  52.3    Sum 3 sectors  75.9 
Note: Share of sectoral productivity gaps, weighted by employment shares, as a fraction of the sum of all weighted 
sectoral productivity gaps. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
The dominant role of the manufacturing sector as a source of the national productivity 
gap is particularly pronounced in the case of Slovenia with an indicator of over 50%. 
Although the manufacturing sectors’ productivity gap had diminished significantly (by 
more than 8 percentage points between 1993 and 2000), much smaller productivity 
gaps in other sectors and an exceptionally high employment share account for this 
dominant role. The Czech Republic finds slightly more than 35% of her national pro-
ductivity gap caused by the manufacturing sector. Here, the productivity gap remained 
by-and-large unchanged between 1993 and 2000. In the other countries, the manufac-
turing sector plays an even less important role, yet remains clearly dominant around 
30%. The lowest manufacturing source for the national productivity gap is to be found 
in Estonia. The country additionally exhibits a more evenly distribution of sectoral 
                                                 
7  This result might again be driven by the methodological difference in the treatment of unemployed 
land-owners as small-scale farmers. Again assuming a corrected employment share, the agricultu-
ral sector would be placed behind household-related services (trade, transport and communication) 
in the list. The industrial sectors would then advance to the top of the list just as in the other count-




sources in general, in as much as the sum of the three most important sectors only 
reaches less than 50%. 
The second most important group of sectors across the CEECs assessed here belong to 
the broad sector of public administration, education, health and social services 
(NACE: L-O).8 This result, however, can be expected to be inflated due to the inher-
ited role of administrative prices as re-distributive instrument. This role, however, can 
be expected to diminish gradually in the course of integration and restructuring of 
these sectors: in the process of rising wages and incomes in the private sector, prices 
will adjust upwards. In particular, employment shares in this broad sector are generally 
lower as compared to the average EU-15 (see table 2). In the case of Slovenia (and 
possibly in Poland, even when discounting the high employment share in agriculture), 
public administration plays a comparatively weak role. In particular in the Slovak Re-
public, but also in Hungary, the Czech Republic and in Estonia, this broad sector ac-
counts for a much larger share of the national productivity gap. With a sum of on av-
erage 30%, the role played by the broad sector of public administration is comparable 
to the role played by the manufacturing sector alone. 
The role played by household-related services (NACE: G-I) is important particularly 
in Poland, Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia. This, however, might probably be more due 
to a price-effect than a question of efficient allocation of resources. Typically, house-
hold-related services are not internationally tradable. With rising income and wealth, 
prices for such services will tend to increase, narrowing the sectoral productivity gap 
and the sector’s role in the national productivity gap. Enterprise-related services 
(NACE: J+K) are to a large extent tradable; in particular financial services are well in-
tegrated with the West, following engagement of foreign banks in Central East 
Europe. The intensity of competition is high, hence, productivity gaps are low. Prices 
for the non-tradable part of enterprise-related services (mainly to be found in real es-
tate, renting and business activities, NACE: K) will tend to be lower due to the same 
reason as with household-related services and do not count as technology-intensive. In 
line with that, enterprise-related services only play a relevant role in the case Slovenia. 
Despite the typically small relative size of the construction sector (NACE: F), it does 
still play a relevant role apart from in the cases of the Slovak and Czech Republics. 
Given this assessment of results, the analysis indicates that in accession countries, po-
tentials for a closure of the productivity gap today predominantly lie with efficiency-
improvements in manufacturing industry. Indeed, industrial manufacturing productiv-
ity gaps have fallen during the period of analysis particularly fast in Estonia and the 
Slovak Republic and to a lesser extent in Slovenia. In the case of the latter two, how-
ever, gaps still remain the largest in our sample of CEECs. In Poland, Hungary and the 
                                                 
8  Again, results have to be interpreted with due care, due to the methodological problems with price 




Czech Republic, industrial manufacturing gaps have closed up, yet at a much lower 
pace. Given the demonstrated dominant role of industry in real economy convergence 
of all countries assessed, this result suggests that the greatest potentials for the respec-
tive growth paths are to be found here. In the cases of the Slovak Republic, Hungary 
and to a lesser extent in Estonia and the Czech Republic, future productivity increases 
also depend to a high degree on a reduction of the historical re-distributive determina-
tion of prices in public administration, education and social services. Productivity gaps 
in this sector diminished in all those accession countries; only in the Slovak Republic 
was this improvement very small. 
Not in all sectors have levels of sectoral productivities converged: significant increases 
in sectoral productivity gaps occurred in the agricultural sectors (NACE: A+B) of Po-
land, Slovenia and Hungary. In Poland, the share of agricultural employment grew du-
ring the period of our analysis, whereas it fell in all other accession candidates asses-
sed here. Further significant increases in gaps can be observed in some parts of Czech 
services sectors (in particular NACE: I and J) and the Slovak services sectors (in parti-
cular NACE: H and J), with dramatic increases in gaps in the financial intermediation 
sectors (NACE: J) of both countries, and in the hotels and restaurants sector (NACE: 
H) of the Slovak Republic. 
Furthermore, gaps increased significantly in the electricity, gas and water supply in-
dustry (NACE: E) of the Slovak and Czech Republics, as well as in Poland. This sec-
tor contains some extent of administrative prices. Finally, productivity growth in Hun-
gary’s construction industry (NACE: F) did not meet the same sector’s rate of growth 
in the comparator country of Germany. 
The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
All productivity gaps of the countries assessed here root predominantly in their 
respective manufacturing industries. Only in Poland is this possibly topped by 
the agricultural sector (if official data is taken for granted). 
In Estonia, the manufacturing productivity gap has fallen particularly fast during 
the period of analysis. The country’s sectoral sources of the national productivity 
gaps are more evenly distributed as compared to the other countries. Domestic 
trade in household-related services and the state-administration sector also play 
an important role in determining the national productivity gap. 
In Poland, the results again depend mainly on the agricultural sector. When dis-
counting from this, the manufacturing sector becomes the prime source of the 
national productivity gap. Here, improvements were comparatively slower since 
1993. Next to the afore mentioned sectors, domestic trade as part of the house-
hold-related services sector also accounts for a large share of the national pro-




In the Czech Republic, the industrial productivity gap has narrowed at a com-
paratively slow pace. Despite its small size, the construction sector plays an im-
portant role in explaining the national productivity gap, followed by the state-
administration sector. Productivity gaps have increased in the energy sector, and 
even dramatically in enterprise-related services. 
In the Slovak Republic, manufacturing productivity gaps have also decreased fast 
since 1993. As was the case in the Czech Republic, the state-administration and 
the construction sectors account for large shares in national productivity gaps. Al-
so here, the energy sector’s and the service sector’s productivity levels have in-
creased at a slower pace as was the case in the comparator country of Germany. 
In Hungary, industrial productivity gaps have narrowed, yet at a comparatively 
slow pace. The sectors of state-administration and household-related services al-
so play an important role in explaining the national productivity gaps. The rate 
of growth of productivity in financial intermediation was slightly lower as com-
pared to the one in Germany, increasing the gap. 
In Slovenia, industrial productivity gaps have fallen significantly, yet this sector 
still accounts for by far the largest share in the country’s national productivity 
gap. Hence, the sectoral sources of the productivity gap are much more con-
centrated here than in any other country assessed here. Enterprise-related servi-
ces and domestic trade are also important sources of the national productivity 
gaps in Slovenia. 
1.4  Economic policy considerations of results 
The results of sectoral analysis of determinants of national productivity gaps suggest 
that promoting technological development alone could prove to be insufficient in Hun-
gary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Rather, measures geared towards increasing 
the flexibility in the reallocation of production factors to promote sectoral change 
could be a decisive factor in those countries. Here, the opinion taken by the EU in its 
latest cohesion report (EU 2001b) appears to be well founded. 
The assessment of Poland depends entirely on the view taken on the size of agricul-
tural employment. If it were as high as quoted in national statistics, then complete real 
economy convergence would critically depend on sectoral change reducing agricultu-
ral employment to the benefit of industry and services. 
The analysis into the most important sectors determining the national productivity 
gaps established that future increases of national productivity levels depend to a high 
degree on a convergence of prices in the sectors of public administration, education 




cute potentially socially painful reforms of the state administration and social systems: 
this might prove especially difficult in the case of Hungary, where the formally well 
developed social security system had been significantly downsized in the austerity 
programme of March 1995. It remains to be seen whether accession candidates are 
able to introduce reforms to their state administrations whilst retaining a socially ac-
ceptable level and comprehensive coverage of social security. 
In general and at least in the medium term, economic policy in CEECs could be most 
efficient in closing the productivity gap, if focussed on an upgrading of technology 
and organisation-efficiency in industry via technology transfer and indigenous re-
search and development. Foreign direct investment, closer ties in production, innova-
tion and marketing networks spreading across the West and accession countries, im-
provement of infrastructure as well as financial support and integration of firm-R&D 
and universities are the typical and well tested political measures in this field. Not le-
ast, such policies can also increase the flexibility of production factors to promote the 
kind of sectoral change that this analysis pointed out as necessary for complete pro-
ductivity catch-up in some accession countries. 
2.  Determinants of National Productivity Growth 
Productivity growth can root from several sources. Typically, sources of productivity 
growth would be assessed in the methodological framework of sectoral ‘growth ac-
counting’: in a first step, production (or cost) functions would be estimated. In a sec-
ond step, the resulting indicator for technological progress could be compared with 
observed productivity growth to distinguish the technological from other sources of 
productivity growth (like e. g. reduction in overmanning, structural change, etc.). 
This method was not applied here. First, for growth accounting to make sense, it is ne-
cessary to estimate the value of the capital stock for each country assessed. The neces-
sary data base for such an exercise, however, is not available: following systemic 
transformation, a large fraction of the capital stock turned obsolete practically over 
night – some of the capital was scrapped, but some is still in operation. It impossible to 
estimate a sensible value of such capital still in operation plus capital newly invested 
without extensive field work – a task which only a national statistical office can com-
prehensively fulfil. The alternative possibility of the perpetual inventory method can 
only produce sensible estimations if sufficiently long historical time series of deprecia-
tion and investment exist. This, however, is not the case for transition economies. 
Following a brief description if actual productivity growth the our sample of countries, 




tant non-technological sources of productivity growth directly by use of simple em-
pirical methods. This way, the results are robust, and speculation can be separated 
from analysis (rather than an implicit intertwining of assumptions and facts in an ap-
plication of a comprehensive model). 
2.1  Setting the agenda: growth of national productivity 
All countries assessed here experienced positive real growth rates of national produc-
tivity levels at least since 1994/1993 (see Chart 3). The notable exceptions are Estonia 
and the Czech Republic. Both countries achieved negative rates in 1994/1993. In Es-
tonia, this is mainly because the country started some years later with systemic transi-
tion – transformational recession was still active in 1994. Not least due to the much 
lower starting level, Estonia achieved the comparably highest productivity growth 
rates over the total period of analysis between 1993 and 2000. In the Czech Republic, 
the negative growth rate in 1994/1993 is mainly due to (as noted above) the dramatic 
fall in productivity levels in enterprise-related services (NACE: J), which was particu-
larly pronounced back then. The country’s comparatively weakest productivity growth 
performance in the group of countries for the total period can be attributed additionally 
to the financial crisis with negative GDP growth rates between 1997 and 1999. 
Chart 3: 
Growth of national productivity levels in CEECs and the average EU-15, 1994/1993 to 
2000/1999 
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Average per anno productivity growth (1994/1993 through 2000/1999):
      EE                  PO                  CR                  SR                  HU                  SI                  EU-15
     8.3%               5.5%               2.2%               5.5%               3.8%              4.9%                 1.8%  
Note: The rates of growth have been calculated in national currency and constant prices. 




At least since 1995/1994 were growth rates of national labour productivities in acces-
sion candidates consistently higher as compared to the countries’ integration region of 
the EU-15. Hence were can observe some productivity catch up, some closure of nati-
onal productivity gaps. 
Whilst Poland and the Slovak Republic achieve comparable average p.a. growth rates 
for the whole period of 1993 to 2000, Poland’s growth path of national productivity 
shows a rising trend and is more consistent as compared to the one in the Slovak Re-
public. This is mainly due to the country’s consistently high GDP growth during the 
same period. Slovenia also exhibits a consistent growth path of national labour pro-
ductivity, yet at slightly lower level. Hungary’s productivity performance during the 
total period is still a bit weaker with on average 3.8%, and shows a falling trend. This, 
however, coincides with positive growth of employment: positive productivity growth 
coinciding with positive employment growth was only achieved amongst this panel of 
candidate countries by Hungary since 1997 and in Slovenia since 1998. In all other 
countries, productivity growth was of a labour-saving kind. 
2.2  Productivity growth and changes in employment 
What are the main sources of productivity growth? In a first approach, the analysis at-
tempts to establish, how much of it can be attributed to labour-saving technological 
change, or to a reduction of the kind of overmanning typical to firms in socialist 
economies. In contrast, in what countries were productivity increases actually accom-
panied by employment growth via improvements of competitiveness? At the micro-
economic level of enterprises, the question pertains to whether firm-restructuring was 
rather defensive or strategic (see Roland 2000, p. 234). That means: did the process 
involve either downsizing to less profitable entities and factors of the firm (or com-
plete firms), or rather a strategic reorientation of the firm by way of adjustment in the 
product variety, product and process innovations, successful marketing strategies, etc. 
with the aim of increasing the firm’s competitiveness? In reality, both effects will have 
increased productivity growth, but the question pertains to the relative share of either 
effect. 
As note in the introduction to chapter 2, this question was approached by assessing 
productivity and employment levels’ annual data between the years of 1993 to 2000 
by use of a simple correlations analysis: a large and significant negative correlation 
would indicate that productivity growth can to a large extent be attributed to a down-
ward adjustment of employment in firms (or even the firm’s exit) in an attempt to gain 
competitiveness on an increasingly contestible market due to integration with the EU. 
On the other extreme, a significant positive correlation would suggest that firms were 
able to employ additional -and more productive- personnel, and/or that the number of 




In fact, Estonia’s productivity growth was until recently mainly accompanied by a re-
duction of employment (see table 4). This might be due to either layoffs in firms, whe-
re personnel did not contribute significantly to produce value added (reduction of soci-
alist overmanning). Or, productivity gains were ‘bought’ by labour-saving technologi-
cal advancement. Finally, national productivity growth could have been a result of 
some of the least productive firms exiting the market without being (fully) replaced by 
more productive firms. In Hungary and possibly Slovenia, the same employment-
reducing productivity growth-pattern during the first sub-period of 1993 to 1996 is in-
dicated by the results. In the case of Hungary, this result is even statistically signifi-
cant. However, in both countries, this pattern reversed in the second sub-period from 
1997 to 2000. Then, national productivity could grow hand-in-hand with growth in the 
number of employed persons. 
Table 4: 
Productivity and employment at the sectoral level: a correlation analysis 
  Sub-period 1  Sub-period 2  Total period 
  1993 - 1996  1997 - 2000  1993 - 2000 
Estonia -0.80
  -1.00*** -0.93*** 
Poland +1.00***  -1.00***  +0.67 
Czech Republic  +0.80  -1.00***  -0.62 
Slovak Republic  +0.80  -1.00***  -0.02 
Hungary -1.00***  +1.00***  -0.25 
Slovenia -0.40  +1.00***  +0.14 
Note: Non-parametric, Spearman correlation. – *** Significant at the 1% level, – ** at the 5% level, and – * at the 
10% level. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
In the other countries, the story is not as easily told: here, earlier productivity growth 
was achieved in parallel with employment growth. This, however, does not appear to 
have been sustainable: in Poland and the Slovak Republic, the change in the producti-
vity growth regime coincided with a downward adjustment in GDP growth rates, and 
in the Czech Republic, GDP growth abated due to financial crisis in 1997. 
Common to all countries apart from Slovenia and Hungary is therefore that during the 
more recent past (second sub-period), productivity growth was achievable only at the 
expense of employment growth. Considering the high rates of unemployment in those 
countries, it will be particularly important to generate the kind of productivity growth 
which does not rely on a rationalisation of labour – or to achieve high enough overall 
productivity growth rates to allow improved competitiveness to overcompensate la-




2.3  The shares of sectoral change in national productivity growth 
The second approach in our analysis of sources of productivity growth assesses struc-
tural change at the sectoral level. Statistically, productivity growth rates are an aggre-
gate effect of productivity changes in individual sectors and shifts between sectors. 
E. g. the more agricultural employment migrated to manufacturing industry (with typi-
cally higher levels of sectoral productivities), the higher was ceteris paribus also na-
tional productivity growth. The intensity of sectoral structural change between the i 
sectors of an economy can best be assessed by use of a deviation indicator, here the 
Euclid-measure: 
) ) ( (
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t a a s  (7) 
It provides an indication of how much economies have been subject to structural ad-
justment at the sectoral level in the course of integration and catch-up development. 
Chart 4 provides an overview of intensities of structural change at the sectoral level 
(including the 15 single digit NACE sectors of A-O) in our accession candidates for 
each year between 1992/1991 and 2000/1999. 
Chart 4: 
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The most obvious result from this exercise is that sectoral change has been more in-
tense early into the transformation period, abating with time. Only in Poland and Hun-
gary is that result not as robust as in the other countries. Estonia started later with 
systemic transition, hence structural adjustments can be expected to be comparatively 
higher even today. In the other countries, sectoral change as of latest show an intensi-
ty-index of about 1, and even undercut by Slovenia with a level of 0.6. These results 
indicate that sectoral adjustment to systemic change and integration have been intense 
at the outset of economic liberalisation but short-lived. By today, most of the adjust-
ment has taken place and intensities in CEECs have reached levels comparable to e. g. 
Germany (average 1993-2000: 0.8) or Italy (average 1993-2000: 0.6). 
From the Euclid-measure, however, one cannot infer the direction of change, and 
hence its effect on productivity growth. The identification of sectors growing relative 
to others is however an important issue in the assessment of national productivity 
growth. Productivity growth which roots to a large extent in changes of sectoral struc-
tures indicates a high degree of restructuring at a macro or mezzo level of the econ-
omy. In contrast, if national productivity grew without much sectoral change, then ei-
ther sectoral structures are sufficiently competitive (or adapted to the new competitive 
surrounding in the new integration area) and restructuring appeared within sectors. 
The following analysis not only relates the extent of sectoral change to growth of na-
tional productivities. Rather, the analysis attempts to identify the extent to which pro-
ductivity increases at the national level can be explained by restructuring between sec-
tors. This then includes not only the extent of restructuring but also its direction. 
Following the same intuition as in the above sectoral analysis, the share of observed 
national productivity growth that rooted exclusively in sectoral structural change is 
calculated. The rate of growth of national productivity levels between the points in 
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 (8) 
The rate of growth of national productivity levels which roots exclusively in the statis-
tical effect of change of sectoral patterns is calculated by assuming that no productiv-
ity growth had occurred within individual sectors, i. e. sectoral productivity levels are 
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 (9) 
The results of this statistical calculation (see Chart 5) suggest that the largest share of 




with 27% (or 1.5 percentage points). This coincides with the country’s second but lar-
gest intensity of sectoral change amongst the other fellow economies. 
Chart 5: 
Shares of sectoral change in national productivity growth, 1994/1993 to 2000/1999 
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Remainder Sectoral change
    16%                          0%                            26%                          27%                          21%                        12%
 
Note: The rates of growth have been calculated in national currency and constant prices. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
Estonia highest intensities of sectoral change amongst the countries assessed did not 
translate into equally high shares of sectoral change in productivity growth. Rather, 
structural adjustment between sectors only account for some 16% of national produc-
tivity growth. The main reason for this can be found in an exceptionally small varia-
tion of productivity levels between sectors (see chart 2). On the other extreme, inten-
sity of sectoral change between 1993 and 2000 in the Czech Republic was the lowest 
in our country sample, yet the share of sectoral change contributed with 26% to na-
tional productivity growth, i. e. nearly as much as in the Slovak Republic. This result 
is mainly driven by employment growth in the financial intermediation sector at the 
expense of the agricultural sector – the latter typically exhibiting much lower sector-
specific levels of productivity. 
Despite the fact that Hungary, Slovenia and Poland reach on average comparable in-
tensities of sectoral change between 1993 and 2000, sectoral change itself during the 
same period of time played a comparatively large role for productivity growth in Hun-




land.9 Poland’s development of national productivity appears to not have been driven 
by sectoral change at all, but rather exclusively by productivity growth within sectors. 
‘Within-sectoral productivity growth’ (i. e. the share of productivity growth which ex-
cludes the pure statistical effect) can be held to contain a larger share of technological 
advancement proper as compared to ‘between-sectoral productivity growth’. For obvi-
ous reasons, this does not mean that ‘within sectoral productivity growth’ can be 
equated with technological advancement per se. Rather, an economy exhibiting a 
lower share of sectoral change in national productivity growth can be expected to also 
have achieved a higher share of technological advancement in comparison to an eco-
nomy with a high share of the sectoral content. Then a comparison of results between 
the Slovak Republic and Poland, despite having achieved identical growth rates of na-
tional labour productivities, would suggest that Poland has possibly experienced more 
technological advancement as compared to the Slovak Republic.10 In the case of the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, the results suggest that their productivity growth pattern 
included significant shares of the statistical effect, whereas this is less pronounced in 
the cases of Estonia and Slovenia. 
2.4  The role of individual sectors as sources of national  
productivity growth 
Which sectors are subsequently mainly responsible for national productivity growth? 
Using the same methodology as in chapter 1.3 (see formula 5 and 6), adapted to 
growth variables, formula 10 and 11 calculate the quantitative role of the sector i as a 
source of national productivity growth: in the three sectors listed in table 5, sector-
specific productivity levels grew particularly fast and these sectors have large shares in 
the economy. The sum of the roles of these three sectors provides a picture of the level 
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9  This adds credence to this indicator: rather than observing the intensity of sectoral change alone 
(possibly even calculating regressions), our indicator of the share of sectoral change in productivity 
growth can inform about the actual role of structural change for productivity growth. 
10  A further, more disaggregated analysis of the sources of productivity growth within sectors is 
needed to generate a clearer picture. This is the focus of the following sub-section in which exem-
plarily the manufacturing industry is assessed, assuming that this sector holds the most interesting 




The first result to be read from this analysis is that the sector of manufacturing 
(NACE: D) played the most important role in respective national productivity growth 
in all countries of our sample. Not only is manufacturing the most influential sector 
explaining national productivity gaps (with the exception of Poland), manufacturing 
also accounts for the largest source of productivity growth. The distances to the second 
most influential sectors for national productivity growth in all countries assessed is 
sufficiently large to grants this sector a particularly important role in the analysis of 
productivity in CEECs, which is reflected in chapter 3. 
Table 5: 
Ranking of the most influential sectors as sources of national productivity growth,  
between 1994/1993 and 2000/1999 
Estonia  Poland   Czech  Republic 
Sector  i π ˆ    Sector  i π ˆ    Sector  i π ˆ  
D 21.0    D  20.3    D 30.6 
I 11.3    A 15.4    G  12.4 
N 9.7    G 14.0    F 7.8 
Sum 3 Sectors  42.0    Sum 3 Sectors  49.7    Sum 3 Sectors  50.8 
 
Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
Sector  i π ˆ    Sector  i π ˆ    Sector  i π ˆ  
D 27.7    D  28.8    D 34.4 
A+B 9.6    G  12.4    G  12.6 
I 9.4    I  9.8    F  7.2 
Sum 3 Sectors  46.7    Sum 3 Sectors  51.0    Sum 3 Sectors  54.2 
Note: Share of sectoral productivity growth, weighted by employment shares, as a fraction of the sum of all weigh-
ted sectoral productivity growth rates. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
Between all countries assessed, household-related services, namely domestic trade 
(NACE: G) and transport, storage and communication (NACE: I) appear to also be-
long to the most influential sectors for national productivity growth. In addition, agri-
culture played a leading role in the cases of mainly Poland and possibly also the Slo-
vak Republic (although here, the agricultural and fishing sectors could not distinguis-
hed in the raw data), and the construction industry, despite being relatively small in si-
ze, in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
Interestingly, the highest level of concentration of national productivity growth on the 




domestic trade with indicators of over 10%. The most evenly distribution of sectoral 
sources can yet again be found in Estonia. 
The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
Estonia achieved the highest rates of growth of national labour productivity. 
This growth, however, was not driven by technological advancement only, it 
was rather accompanied over the whole period of analysis by a reduction of 
overmanning, i. e. falling employment. The country also exhibits the highest in-
tensity of employment shifts between sectors, yet the share of sectoral change in 
productivity growth turned out to be rather moderate. This means that the sta-
tistical effect of productivity growth due to structural change was not as high as 
the intensity of sectoral change would suggest, which can be explained by only 
small differences between levels of productivity of the sectors assessed. 
Poland experienced a clear upward trend in national productivity growth, aver-
aging between 1993 and 2000 some 5.5% p.a. This parallels the exceptionally 
high growth rates of GDP during the same period. However since 1998, produc-
tivity grew at the expense of employment. Poland’s national productivity growth 
was not driven by the statistical effect of sectoral change at all, this despite the 
fact that the intensity of sectoral change was significant, yet comparatively low. 
In the Czech Republic, productivity growth was clearly the lowest amongst the 
countries assessed (averaging 2.2%). This meagre result was furthermore paral-
leled by a reduction in employment since 1997. In addition to that, a very large 
fraction of this productivity growth can also be attributed to sectoral change (a 
shift of employment from low to high productivity sectors) rather than an im-
provement of technology and efficiency of use of resources at the firm level. 
Productivity growth in the Slovak Republic turned out much higher, yet with a 
falling trend. These falling rates were moreover accompanied by falling 
employment since 1997. As was the case in the Czech Republic, national pro-
ductivity growth was driven to a large extent by employment shifts between sec-
tors. Here, sectoral change was particularly intensive. 
In the case of Hungary, productivity growth also exhibits a falling trend, but 
here, employment actually grew since 1997. The sectoral composition of Hunga-
ry’s economy did change considerably between 1993 and 2000, and in line with 
that, sectoral change plays an important role in explaining national productivity 
growth. 
Relatively high productivity growth rates in Slovenia were also accompanied by 
growing employment sine 1998. Here, sectoral change was intense, yet its role in 




2.5  Economic policy considerations of results 
Economic growth in general and productivity growth at the national level in particular 
are not sufficient conditions alone to increase competitiveness of firms, i. e. to im-
prove the potentials of firms to withstand intensifying competition in the process of in-
tegration with the EU. 
Rather, in the cases of the Slovak Republic and Estonia, above-average rates of growth 
of national productivity were ‘bought’ to a large extent by falling employment and 
structural shifts in employment at the sectoral level. In effect, therefore, the pure tech-
nological content of productivity growth is lower than predicted by productivity 
growth rates. This might serve to signal to economic policy-makers that additional re-
form and/or support efforts at the micro-level could improve the countries’ conditions 
for catch-up development. 
Our analysis suggests that in both countries, such intervention might turn out to be 
most profitable in terms of productivity growth in the manufacturing sectors, in Esto-
nia additionally in household-related services of transport, storage and communica-
tion. Additional research (in particular see the next section on manufacturing industry 
and research in other workpackages of this project), however, is needed to pinpoint the 
specific fields of intervention where and how scarce resources are best allocated to. 
The same applies to the Czech Republic, albeit here, productivity growth additionally 
turned out to be rather slow, mainly due to the country’s suffering a financial crisis in 
1997. 
In Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, the pictures are rather mixed: whilst in Poland, 
above-average productivity growth rates were achieved only by way of falling em-
ployment (at least towards the end of the period of analysis), those rates were actually 
achieved within each sector, and not via structural change at the sectoral level. This 
could lead us to conclude that sectoral restructuring could further improve the 
country’s conditions for catch up development. 
Economic policy could assist structural adjustment by increasing flexibility and re-
moving possibly existing barriers to the migration of employment between regions and 
sectors of the economy. Hungary and Slovenia both achieved average productivity 
growth rates, whilst assisted by sectoral restructuring, still however substantial enough 
to allow employment to grow in the recent past. Here, the scope for additional econo-
mic policy appears to be rather small: firms are already improving competitiveness, 
and the economies have gone some way in adjusting sectoral structures. Hence, eco-
nomic policy could aim at improving general condition for economic activity, amongst 




3.  The Focus on the Sector of Manufacturing Industry:  
Determinants of Productivity Gaps in Manufacturing 
Sectoral analysis highlighted the sector of manufacturing industry as the most influen-
tial sector as a source of productivity gaps and national productivity growth (with the 
possible exception of the role of agriculture in Poland). This suggests that further ana-
lysis should produce the most promising results if focussed on manufacturing. What is 
even more, objectives of analysis in this workpackage included the notion of speciali-
sation in domestic production – and its effect on productivity growth and potentials. 
Specialisation can be assumed to be most pronounced in the case of manufacturing 
branches due to the high share of tradeables. 
Research on specialisation-matters typically focuses on a theoretical explanation of 
emerging specialisation-patterns by use of models of the tradition of Heckscher-Ohlin 
or Ricardo. Some more recent literature attempts to use New Trade and New Growth 
Theories (see e. g. the large body of literature by Grossman-Helpman, Krugman, Puga 
and Venables), but usually falls short of expectations in terms of an empirical applica-
tion of these concepts. With the demise of structuralism as a theoretical concept of de-
velopment economics (see body of literature by Prebish), very little theoretical re-
search proceeds from there to interpret specialisation-patterns in terms of conditions 
for economic catch-up. This research matter is largely non-existent in empirical appli-
cations. At most, empirical research examines whether industrial structures are either 
‘advantageous’ or ‘disadvantageous’, without however providing a sound theoretical 
framework.11 
Some theoretical models, predominantly based on endogenous growth theories and 
economic geography concepts, perceive the possibility of catching up not taking place 
in particular conditions due to externalities, non-perfect competition, path dependence, 
and hysteresis (e. g. ‘North-South’, ‘core-periphery’ models, Krugman’s and Posner’s 
‘technology gap’ and ‘imitation gap’ models, ‘product life cycle theories’, ‘quality lad-
der’ concepts, Snower’s ‘low-skill, bad-job trap’ model (1994), see Wolfmayr-Schnitzer 
(1999) for a literature-review of integration theories). In general, however, such mo-
dels remain largely theoretical and do not lend themselves to a convincing empirical 
analysis. 
Analysis in the two sub-sections below follows largely the same points of interest and 
methods as was the case in sub-section 2.1 and 2.2 on the sectoral level. This time, the 
                                                 
11 See  e. g.  Peneder (2000), p. 21, and Zeman (2002). A more demanding approach is used by 
Mickiewicz, Zalewska (2002) on a sectoral level. Here, a particular theory from the de-industriali-




focus of interest is on the manufacturing sector and the structures and development of 
specialisation within the manufacturing sector. 
The concept of specialisation used here assesses division of labour between individual 
CEECs and the current EU. Analysis of specialisation is therefore comparative in na-
ture and should use data at the lowest possible level of aggregation. Comparative in-
dustrial data, however, is not available for the average EU-15, hence comparison is 
made to Germany. Here, analysis can make use of productivity data at a 2-digit NACE 
level and for a selection of accession states and Germany even employment data on  
3-digit NACE level from the CRONOS database of EUROSTAT. 
3.1  Setting the agenda: the sizes of productivity gaps in branches of 
manufacturing and branch specialisation 
Slovenia’s manufacturing industry exhibits the lowest productivity gap for total manu-
facturing (NACE: D) when compared to Germany (see table 6). In fact, the levels of 
productivity of some of the most advanced manufacturing branches in Slovenia even 
outclass their counterparts in Germany: ‘transport equipment’ (NACE: DM) reaches a 
level 28.5% higher than in Germany, and ‘food products, beverages and tobacco’ 
(NACE: DA), a level 21.7% higher than the same branch in Germany. On the bottom 
end of the scale, Slovenia’s weakest branches exhibit productivity gaps of up to nearly 
80% (in particular ‘coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel’, NACE: DF). 
By far the largest productivity gap in total manufacturing vis-à-vis Germany was diag-
nosed for Estonia, with the most developed branch still exhibiting a gap of some 40% 
(‘food products, beverages and tobacco’). However, the largest branch-specific pro-
ductivity gap is not to be found in Estonia, but rather in the Slovak Republic with over 
85% in the branch of ‘textiles and textile products’ (NACE: DB). For total manufac-
turing, the Slovak Republic’s gap (53.3%) is average amongst the countries assessed. 
Poland’s manufacturing industry is the second but weakest within our sample with a 
gap of 58.1%. Amongst the most developed branches, Poland’s ‘pulp, paper and paper 
products, publishing and printing-industry’ (NACE: DE) still exhibits a gap of some 
22%. The gaps for total manufacturing of Hungary and the Czech Republic are compa-
rable to the Slovak Republic. In Hungary, the lowest gap is reported for ‘transport  
equipment’, probably an effect of foreign direct investment. In the Czech Republic, 
the industry of ‘food products, beverages and tobacco’ has come closest to productivi-
ty levels in Germany. 
It is quite obvious to see, that the industry branch of ‘food products, beverages and to-
bacco- manufacturing’ is the most advanced in our country sample in terms of produc-
tivity. This is followed by the manufacturing branches of ‘transport equipment’ and 




re EU accession states have come closest to branch-specific levels of productivity in 
Germany, yet in most cases, countries were not able to align their branch specialisati-
on in domestic production to correspond to these productivity results. 
Table 6: 
Branch productivity gaps vis-à-vis Germany and structural differences in employment 
shares, in 2000 
Estonia    Poland    Czech Republic 
Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −     Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −     Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −  
DA 39.3  + 5.3    DE 22.3  -1.8    DA 7.8  -0.6 
DD 45.4  + 9.4    DA 37.3  -2.7    DI 26.8  +2.8 
DE 51.8  -2.2    DL 39.7  -1.8    DE 30.7  -4.1 
... ...  ...    ... ...  ...    ... ...  ... 
DB 66.8  +15.6    DK 60.0  -4.3    DB 55.9  + 6.5 
DL 67.9  -4.3    DC 65.3  +2.7    DK 56.7  -1.7 
DK 75.2  -10.0    DB 68.2  +10.6    DF 61.4  + 0.1 
Total D  68.1  +1.0    Total D  58.1  -3.4    Total D  50.0  +5.5 
 
Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −     Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −     Branch 
i
D CEE / π  
D CEE α α −  
DF -  4.7  + 1.0    DM     1.3     - 6.8    DM -  28.5     - 8.0 
DM 30.0   - 5.9    DG 30.2     - 1.8    DA -  21.7     - 2.7 
DA 33.4  + 0.5    DL 34.5    + 4.8    DE    18.7     - 1.8 
... ...  ...    ... ...  ...    ... ...      ... 
DK 76.0   - 1.4    DK 57.5     - 6.7    DD    50.1    + 2.5 
DC 79.8   + 3.7    DC 68.7    + 2.8    DB   61.4  + 10.6 
DB 85.2   + 8.9    DB 68.8  + 10.3    DF   79.4       0.0 
Total D  53.3  + 4.2    Total D  51.0    + 2.6    Total D  42.4    + 7.8 
Note: The three branches with the largest and the three branches with the smallest productivity gaps, in per cent of 
Germany’s branch-productivity levels. Gaps are PPP-corrected to allow comparison across countries and calculated 
according to formula 2. Structural differences presented as percentage points differences of employment shares of 
individual accession states to Germany. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
In particular, in all countries except Estonia, branches with lower productivity gaps are 
actually smaller in size relative to Germany. On the other side of the coin, all countries 
have larger employment shares than Germany (i. e. exhibit positive specialisation) 




are the two most advanced branches also comparatively larger than in Germany (‘food 
products, beverages and tobacco’ and ‘wood and wood products’). In the Czech Re-
public is the second most advanced manufacturing branch larger than in Germany 
(‘other non-metallic mineral products’); in the Slovak Republic the most advanced and 
the third most advanced branches (‘coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel’, 
‘food products, beverages and tobacco’), and in Hungary it is only the third most ad-
vanced branch which exhibits a positive specialisation compared to German manufac-
turing (‘electrical and optical equipment’). 
3.2  The shares of industrial specialisation-differences in  
manufacturing productivity gaps 
Those results lead us to ask for the structural content of manufacturing productivity 
gaps: if specialisation generally favours manufacturing branches which exhibit above-
average productivity gaps, how much of the average manufacturing sector-wide pro-
ductivity gaps are then accountable to specialisation rather than lower levels of tech-
nology in production? 
The magnitude of structural contents of productivity gaps at the manufacturing level is 
calculated according to the same method as applied in the sectoral analysis (see for-
mula 4). Also the same representation of results has been used to facilitate access to 
results (see Chart 6). In comparison to the roles played by differences at the sectoral 
level for determining the national productivity gaps, the roles played by manufacturing 
specialisation for industrial productivity gaps are typically much smaller but have been 
growing in all countries assessed bar the Czech Republic. The highest contents in 2000 
can be found for Slovenia and Hungary: had those two countries had the same struc-
tural pattern in manufacturing as the pattern predominant in Germany, the productivity 
gaps would have turned out to be some 12% lower in both countries. In the other 
countries, much smaller shares of the manufacturing productivity gaps are accountable 
to the countries’ structural differences. 
In 1993, structural patterns of manufacturing in the Slovak Republic and Hungary ac-
tually featured larger employment shares in branches with above-average productivity 
levels as compared to Germany: the sectoral content of the manufacturing productivity 
gap was in fact negative. 
Analogous to the theoretical assessment of sectoral contents of national productivity 
gaps, we can here assume that the structural patterns as they evolved between 1993 
and 2000 might represent lasting trends. At a slight variance to the sectoral analysis, 
these interpretations for the manufacturing level can be assumed to be more robust: 
whereas sectoral structures can be assumed to be endogenously determined by the 




the Chenery-Hypothesis), industrial specialisation is typically perceived to be driven 
by constant (at least in the medium term) country-specific factors, comparative advan-
tages.12 At the level of manufacturing industry, therefore, we can assume that at least 
for the medium term, past trends in structural adjustment will prevail and give rise to a 
distinct pattern of specialisation between EU member countries and EU accession 
countries. 
Chart 6: 
Structural contents of manufacturing productivity gaps of CEECs, in 1993 and 2000 
- in per cent of the observed productivity gap - 
1993
2000
Estonia               Poland             Czech Rep.        Slovak Rep.        Hungary           Slovenia
   2.7                   7.5                    6.1                    4.1                   11.6                  12.0
   0.6                   4.3                    7.7                   -4.7                   -3.1                   0.1
 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
If specialisation trends persist into the medium-term future, then the manufacturing 
sectors of mainly Slovenia and Hungary, and to a lesser extent Poland, the Slovak Re-
public and Estonia might not be able to catch up completely to productivity levels of 
the German manufacturing sector: even if branch-specific productivity levels had 
caught up, structural patterns would still effect a lasting productivity gap. This had 
been termed an upper limit to real convergence in the sectoral analysis and should rai-
se concern with economic policy programmes assisting a swift process of real econo-
my catch-up: in such a scenario, technological assistance might turn out to be ineffec-
tive with respect to closing the productivity gap. 
                                                 
12  For a critical assessment of applicability of the Heckscher-Ohlin concept in transition economies 





3.3  The role of individual branches in explaining manufacturing 
productivity gaps 
What are hence the branches that drive contemporary productivity gaps in the manu-
facturing sectors of the countries assessed? What branches are most influential for the 
productivity gaps in terms of size and branch-specific gaps? Applying the same meth-
ods as described by formula 5 and 6 of sectoral analysis, table 7 lists the three most in-
fluential branches. 
Table 7: 
Ranking of most influential branches as a source of manufacturing productivity gaps, 
in 2000 
Estonia   Poland   Czech  Republic 
Branch  i π~    Branch  i π~    Branch  i π~  
DB  22.0   DA  27.9   DJ  20.8 
DA  13.6   DK  13.2   DK  17.8 
DD  12.2   DN  10.8   DB  13.4 
Sum 3 Branches  47.8    Sum 3 Branches  51.9    Sum 3 Branches  52.1 
 
Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
Branch  i π~    Branch  i π~    Branch  i π~  
DK 21.3    DB 20.6    DB  23.9 
DB 18.6    DA  17.7    DJ  19.7 
DL 13.1    DL 14.0    DN  16.6 
Sum 3 Branches  53.0    Sum 3 Branches  52.3    Sum 3 Branches  60.2 
Note: Share of productivity gaps of branches. weighted by employment shares. as a fraction of the sum of weighted 
productivity gaps of all branches. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
Amongst the most influential branches as sources for manufacturing productivity gaps 
countries between the countries assessed, no common pattern can be deducted from 
results. This does come as a surprise, considering that all those countries have shared 
similar histories in economic development as planned socialist economies with a near-
complete separation from the West, and despite the fact that all those countries share 
the common comparative advantage of lower labour (unit) costs13 and larger agricul-
tural sectors in comparison to most countries in West Europe. 
                                                 




Similarities can be diagnosed mainly for the branches of ‘food products, beverages 
and tobacco’ (NACE: DA) and ‘textiles and textile products’ (NACE: DB): either one 
of those manufacturing branches play a leading role in explaining manufacturing pro-
ductivity gaps in each of the countries assessed. In the cases of Estonia and Hungary, 
both branches belong to the group of the thee most influential industries. Both bran-
ches can be considered to be rather less technologically sophisticated and more likely 
to benefit from low labour costs and larger agricultural sectors. 
Results however also show that not only less sophisticated branches are at the root of 
the manufacturing sectors’ productivity gaps, but rather also branches which better 
lend themselves to above-average increases in productivity levels: in Poland, the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, the manufacturing branch of ‘machinery and 
equipment’ (NACE: DK) is listed as influential, as does the branch ‘electrical and op-
tical equipment’ (NACE: DL) belong to the three most important branches for manu-
facturing productivity gaps in the Slovak Republic and Hungary. 
The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
Estonia’s manufacturing sector is still furthest away from closing up the levels 
of economic development predominant in current EU member states, here repre-
sented by German manufacturing. Whilst the country’s national productivity gap 
vis-à-vis Germany amounts to only some 57% and is therefore even lower than 
the national gap of the Polish economy, Estonia’s manufacturing productivity 
gap is some 10 percentage points larger and considerably behind that of Poland. 
Yet, Estonia’s structural pattern within the manufacturing sector features posi-
tive specialisation in those branches that have come closest to productivity levels 
in Germany. In line with this, the structural content of manufacturing productivi-
ty gaps is negligible, further structural change within manufacturing industries 
could not significantly improve conditions for catching up. Between branches, 
the gap is mainly driven by industries related to the country’s large wood-
processing industries (wood and wood products, paper and furniture). 
In the case of Poland with the second largest manufacturing sector’s productivity 
gap, patterns of specialisation favour branches with typically large productivity 
gaps whilst branches exhibiting lower gaps are underrepresented in terms of 
relative employment shares in comparison to the benchmark country Germany. 
As a result of this, the structural content of the manufacturing productivity gap is 
considerable and the most influential manufacturing branches typically share 
low levels of sophistication, like food processing, textiles, and basic metals. 
The Czech Republic has the second but lowest productivity gap amongst the 
countries assessed here. Yet, patterns of specialisation show little corresponden-




nufacturing productivity gap were subsequently diagnosed here. Amongst the 
most influential branches as a source of manufacturing productivity gaps belong 
industries such as motor vehicles, machinery and equipment as more sophistica-
ted branches, but also the branch of basic metals manufacturing. This is obvious-
ly a result of FDI inflows in the Czech car-manufacturing industry, and the asso-
ciated effects on downstream supplier-industries. 
The manufacturing productivity gap of the Slovak Republic is with 53.3% 
somewhat higher as compared to the one of the Czech Republic, yet branch pro-
ductivities exhibit some correspondence with specialisation patterns. Hence, the 
structural content of the manufacturing productivity gap in 2000 is small. It has, 
however, risen considerably since 1993, suggesting that the trend in structural 
adjustment and specialisation might in the future grow into a hindrance for 
complete real economic convergence. The group of most influential manufactur-
ing branches for the sector’s productivity gap largely consists of technologically 
sophisticated industries like motor vehicles, machinery and equipment, and elec-
trical and optical equipment. 
Hungary’s manufacturing productivity gap lies between those of the Czech and 
Slovak Republics. Here, the motor vehicle manufacturing industry nearly caught 
up with German productivity levels, however, specialisation patterns are nega-
tively related to the sizes of productivity levels. Subsequently, Hungary’s manu-
facturing industry might well experience a barrier to real economic convergence: 
the trends in structural adjustment in the course of real economy integration in 
manufacturing industry has led the structural content of the manufacturing sector 
to grow from a negative content in 1993 to a considerable size today, The most 
influential industrial branches driving the Hungarian manufacturing productivity 
gap are typically technologically sophisticated and include branches like electri-
cal and optical equipment, transport equipment, but also food processing, beve-
rages and tobacco. 
The lowest productivity gap in the manufacturing sector with only 42.8% is 
achieved by Slovenia. Here, two manufacturing branches even appear to have 
achieved significantly higher levels of productivity as compared to Germany, 
namely transport equipment and food processing, beverages and tobacco. Those 
branches, however, show a negative specialisation vis-à-vis Germany, hence the 
high structural content of the manufacturing productivity gap. What is even more, 
this content has experienced considerable growth since 1993 and if such trends in 
specialisation prevail. Slovenia might also be unable to catch up completely in 
terms of productivity levels. The group of the most influential branches as sources 
of manufacturing productivity gaps in Slovenia consist mainly of the less sophisti-
cated industries of basic metals and fabricated metal products, and the textile in-
dustry. An important role is however furthermore played by machinery and equip-




3.4  Economic policy considerations of results 
Alike in the policy-interpretation of results from the sectoral analysis, assistance in 
across-the-board technological development alone might prove to be insufficient for 
complete real economy convergence in the manufacturing sectors of some accession 
countries: while such policy measures can be assumed to be most efficient with re-
spect to the envisaged further closing of productivity gaps in all countries assessed, 
they might prove to be less powerful and even ineffective at a later stage in the cases 
of Hungary,  Slovenia and possibly the Slovak Republic. 
In those countries, considerable shares of productivity gaps are accountable to the in-
dustries’ particular patterns of specialisation. Trends in the past suggest that those sha-
res might even rise further to form a barrier to complete convergence when driven by 
technological development only. Here, supporting additional structural change could 
prove to be an effective policy measure. 
In particular, analysis for Slovenia suggested that the manufacturing productivity gaps 
mainly root in technologically less sophisticated industries: those industries are less 
likely to benefit from support for technological advancement as would industries of 
higher technological sophistication. In the case of Slovenia, therefore, policies directed 
towards structural change, e. g. by supporting a delineation of specialisation patterns 
to the sizes of branch-specific productivity gaps could turn out to be more effective. 
For the short term, however, technology-oriented economic policy measures could still 
assist the manufacturing industries of Hungary and the Slovak Republic: in both cases, 
productivity gaps to a large extent root in branches which could be considered to be 
receptive to technology-policy in swift productivity growth. 
Estonia’s manufacturing industry is clearly geared towards wood-processing indus-
tries, in some of which the country already has below-average productivity gaps vis-à-
vis Germany. Here, clearly targeted technology-policy could be expected to yield the 
largest effects. 
In the case of Poland, policy support can probably not be targeted as narrowly to a de-
fined goal with respect to structures in manufacturing industries. Rather intervention 
and support would have to consider structural change just as much as technological 




4.  The Focus on the Sector of Manufacturing Industry:  
Determinants of Manufacturing Productivity Growth 
The following subsection assesses the sources of productivity growth, this time of the 
manufacturing sectors of EU accession countries. The data limitations again make it 
unfeasible to approach this topic by way of a growth accounting exercise – in fact data 
on capital stocks at this level of disaggregation are even less frequently available, and 
less likely to be reliable than is the case at the sectoral level. The analysis therefore 
largely follows the same direct methods as applied at the sectoral level. 
4.1  Setting the agenda: growth of productivity in the  
manufacturing sector 
Productivity growth in manufacturing industry has been much more volatile as com-
pared to national productivity growth with frequent negative growth rates over the 
whole period of analysis (see chart 7). Possibly, the financial crisis in Russia and the 
Czech Republic have had more direct effects on manufacturing productivity growth 
than on the national level: in particular, the Czech rate of manufacturing productivity 
growth turned negative in 1997. More importantly, however, migration of labour be-
tween the manufacturing sector and other sectors will have had a levelling effect on 
national productivity growth (diversification of effects of the crisis). The largest varia-
tion of productivity growth rates can be observed in the case of Estonia: here, rates 
jumped from -15 to some 25% within only two year, i. e. by about 40 percentage 
points. In this case, the average per anno rate of growth over the whole period of 6.1% 
is probably more telling. Rates in the Slovak Republic vary between some 27% in 
1995/1994 and -5% only one year later. The most consistent growth path of productiv-
ity can be observed in Slovenia. 
All accession countries assessed here have achieved higher growth rates as compared 
to the average EU-15 over the whole period of analysis. The Slovak Republic, Slove-
nia and Poland even achieve growth rates exceeding double the rate of the average 
EU-15. In the case of the Slovak Republic, however, this results is driven by the ex-
tremely high rate of growth during the year of 1994. This puzzling rate of growth is 
not a result of a steep fall in industrial employment, or a particularly small increase or 
fall in the GDP deflator. Rather, value added reported for the manufacturing sector 
grew particularly fast between the end of 1994 and that of 1995. The growth rates of 
the Czech Republic and Poland over the whole period of analysis reach average levels 
between 5.7% and 6.9% respectively. In general and over the whole period of analysis 
we can clearly observe productivity catch-up for the manufacturing sector, i. e. some 




4.2  Productivity growth in the manufacturing sector and changes 
in employment levels 
Again, a simple correlation analysis was applied to indicate in how much manufactur-
ing productivity growth can be attributed to labour-saving technological change and to 
a reduction in overmanning at the firm level (see the defensive versus strategic strat-
egy-dichotomy as suggested by Roland 2999, op. cit.). In terms of the analytical ap-
proach applied here, a large and significant negative correlation between employment 
and productivity levels would indicate downward adjustment of employment at the 
firm level, or the exit of below-average productivity firms. A large and significant po-
sitive correlation can be interpreted as firms having successfully employed additional 
labour and/or as new and more productive firms having successfully entered the market. 
Chart 7: 
Growth of productivity in manufacturing sectors in CEECs and the average EU-15, 
1994/1993 to 2000/1999 
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Average per anno productivity growth (1994/1993 through 2000/1999):
      EE                  PO                  CR                  SR                  HU                  SI                  EU-15
     6.1%               6.9%               5.7%               9.1%               6.3%              7.8%                 3.4%
 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
At the national level in section 2 of this report, the analysis showed a clearer picture of 
a shift from employment augmenting (between 1993 and 1996) to labour saving pro-
ductivity growth (1997 to 2000) in most accession countries with the notable excep-
tion of Hungary and Slovenia. This is not as clear-cut at the level of the manufacturing 
sector: here, industrial productivity growth in both sub-periods is accompanied by a 
fall in industrial employment in most countries. Labour saving technological change 
and/or reduction in overmanning appears to be the dominant driving factor of produc-




The notable exceptions are Poland and the Slovak Republic during the first sub-period 
of analysis and Hungary between the years of 1997 and 2000. In those cases, employ-
ment and productivity exhibit a positive correlation, which however is not significant 
and could therefore be the result of a random process. 
Table 8: 
Productivity and employment in the manufacturing sector: a correlation analysis (non-
parametric) 
  Sub-period 1  Sub-period 2  Total period 
  1993 - 1996  1997 - 2000  1993 - 2000 
Estonia  - 1.00***  - 0.40  - 0.91*** 
Poland  + 0.80  - 1.00***  - 0.33 
Czech Republic  - 1.00***  - 0.40  - 0.81** 
Slovak Republic  + 0.60  - 0.60  - 0.29 
Hungary  - 0.80  + 0.20  - 0.05 
Slovenia -  0.80  -1.00***  -  0.98*** 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level,  – ** at the 5% level, –  * at the 10% level. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
In Hungary, industrial employment started to rise already in 1995, after the country 
overcame transformational recession. However, industrial productivity fell slightly in 
1998 and 1999, only to pick up again during the year of 2000. In all other accession 
countries assessed here, industrial employment grew only from 2000 onwards in paral-
lel with positive productivity growth (in Estonia already in 1999, however at the ex-
pense of productivity growth in the same year). The picture drawn for Poland and the 
Slovak Republic indicates that high initial rates of growth of value added in manufac-
turing did not necessitate deep restructuring until 1995/1996. Then, however, value 
added growth abated significantly in both countries. Employment growth in manufac-
turing industry was not sustainable any more from then onwards, and the correlation 
coefficient turned negative. 
In Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, manufacturing productivity growth was 
accompanied by a significant downward adjustment of industrial employment. over 
the whole period of analysis. Considering the development of unemployment, further 
productivity growth will have to be increasingly labour-augmenting, or sufficiently 
high to allow improved competitiveness to let employment growth exceed the labour 
saving effect. In effect, this is already the case in Estonia and Hungary since 2000, and 
in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia since 2001, not as yet, how-




The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
Estonia’s manufacturing productivity growth was been most volatile with con-
siderable shifts from large negative to large positive rates and vice versa. Over 
the total period of analysis, average productivity growth was rather low, yet still 
faster than in the average EU-15. This productivity growth was mainly achieved 
by way of reducing overmanning or the exit of less efficient firms. Future pro-
ductivity growth as yet still has to allow employment in manufacturing industry 
to rise. Parallel growth ion employment and productivity can however be obser-
ved already for the year of 2000. 
Poland’s productivity growth in the manufacturing sector is somewhat larger 
than in Estonia, rates are also less volatile over the years than in most other 
countries assessed. Over the whole period, productivity growth exceeded that of 
the average EU-15 by more than double, or 3.5 percentage points. During the  
initial years, manufacturing productivity growth was achieved in parallel with 
growing employment. This, however, proved to be not sustainable, and further 
productivity growth was ‘bought’ by a downward adjustment of labour use. Fu-
ture productivity growth as yet still has to allow employment in manufacturing 
industry to rise. 
Growth of manufacturing productivity in the Czech Republic has experienced a 
considerable slump due to the country’s financial crisis in 1997 with its associ-
ated demise in real economy growth.. Hence, the Czech Republic exhibits the 
lowest rate of growth of manufacturing productivity over the whole period   
amongst the countries assessed. In the aftermath of the crisis, however, produc-
tivity growth picked up again. This productivity growth was mainly driven by a 
downward adjustment of employment over the whole period of analysis and 
manufacturing employment only started to grow again in the year 2001, i. e. out-
side of our period of analysis. 
Productivity growth in the manufacturing sector of the Slovak Republic is 
clearly dominated by the exorbitant growth rate in 1995, for which no suffi-
ciently convincing explanation could be found. Following this, rates of growth 
have been rather moderate and considerably volatile. As was the case in Poland, 
productivity growth started to go hand in hand with positive employment growth 
in the manufacturing sector during the early years of integration. Also here, this 
proved to be unsustainable, and the downward adjustment set in during the year 
of 1997. By the year of 2001, manufacturing employment started to grow simul-
taneously to productivity in the manufacturing sector. 
Hungary’s development of productivity in the manufacturing sector exhibits 
some distinct features: without suffering from an own financial crisis, the ave-




From 1997 onwards, furthermore, the correlation between employment growth 
and productivity growth turned positive, unlike in all other countries assessed. If 
the manufacturing sector of the country is able to sustain this quality of deve-
lopment, then a consistent path of catching up at a moderate speed seems likely. 
In the case of Slovenia, productivity growth in the manufacturing sector was 
most consistent and always positive. Over the whole period, the country achie-
ves the second but largest average growth rate. This growth was however ac-
companied by a significant reduction in employment in the manufacturing sector 
and a parallel movement of labour and productivity in the upward direction 
could only diagnosed for the year of 2001. 
4.3  The share of inter-branch restructuring in manufacturing  
productivity growth 
The following two sub-chapters aim at assessing the role of branch-structures and 
structural adjustment within manufacturing industry as sources of productivity growth. 
In the course of real economy integration, the industries of integration partners typi-
cally specialise on production, where the respective partner has some comparative ad-
vantage. Because EU accession and member states had developed in near-complete 
separation for nearly 50 years, we would expect structural adjustment and re-
specialisation to have been profound after re-integration began in 1990, only to abate 
later with integration effects gradually wearing off. The analysis of intensity of struc-
tural change by use of the EUCLID-measure (see equation 7) can provide insight into 
the intensity of structural adjustment in each of the accession states of our panel. Data 
used includes the same number of 13 double-digit NACE manufacturing branches of 
DA-DN in all countries assessed. 
As expected, structural change was particularly intense at the outset of integration in 
all countries assessed. In the Czech Republic and Hungary, this is particularly pro-
nounced in the year of 1993, in the Slovak Republic in 1994 and in Estonia, the high-
est intensity is recorded for the year of 1995. The intensities of structural change in 
Poland and Slovenia have been less volatile between years. Here, structural change 
was most intense in 1996, i. e. later than in the other countries, and intensities have 
also been generally lower than in the other countries of our sample. While this indi-
cates some postponed or lagged real economy adjustment, we are unable, however, to 
infer from this analysis alone whether further structural adjustment will be necessary 
or supportive to future productivity growth potentials. More insight into this field will 
be carefully developed in the following sub-chapters. 
At a slight variance to our expectation raised above, intensities of structural change 




ment was still incomplete after the initial surge during the first half of the 1990s. The 
effects of integration on re-specialisation seem to be still ongoing in the latest year re-
ported. This in particular applies to Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Estonia and possi-
bly also the Czech Republic. It is fair to assume that the initial success in productivity 
growth in the manufacturing sectors of these countries did not necessitate more pro-
found restructuring (e. g. by way of reduction of overmanning), productivity growth 
was achieved without much restructuring. Further improvement of competitiveness, 
then, might well have depended on additional adjustment in parallel with deepening 
integration – which includes the process of re-specialisation and restructuring at the 
level of manufacturing branches. 
Chart 8: 
Intensities of structural change between branches of manufacturing industry in CEECs, 
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Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
It is an important result of our analysis that – contrary to common belief – the effects 
of integration on the real sphere of the economy are still ongoing, this even after more 
than a decade of integration. This result, however, pertains to the manufacturing sector 
only: at the national level and between sectors, intensities of structural change show a 
clearly falling trend in all countries assessed. 
This analysis is again refined by determining the direction of change of specialisation 
patterns, and the effect, this change had on the manufacturing productivity gap (the 




same intuition as developed for the sectoral analysis: the structural content denotes the 
statistical effect of productivity levels rising or falling due to the reallocation of labour 
to different uses in different industrial branches (with differing levels of productivity). 
The lower the size of this statistical effect, the larger have been within-branch increa-
ses in productivity levels, the larger can technological advancement be expected to have 
been achieved within firms (or between firms of the same industrial branch). 
Obviously, this analysis will correspond to some degree to the results of the simple as-
sessment of intensities of structural change. Yet here, the direction of structural change 
as well as its quantitative effect on manufacturing productivity growth are highlighted. 
The calculation uses the equations (8) and (9) from the sectoral analysis, only this time 
at the level of the same 14 double-digit NACE manufacturing branches in all countries 
assessed. 
Chart 9: 
Shares of structural change in manufacturing productivity growth, 1994/1993 to 
2000/1999 
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Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
The most obvious result is that, compared to the results generated in the sectoral 
analysis, the structural contents of manufacturing productivity growth turn out to be 
smaller in most countries. Only in the cases of Estonia and Poland are the structural 




In particular, the high intensity of structural change in Estonia had a significant impact 
on productivity growth: over one fifth of manufacturing productivity growth can be 
traced back to employment shifts at the expense of branches which achieved lower 
levels of efficiency of use of resources. Had it not been for this particular reallocation 
of employment between branches of manufacturing, Estonia’s productivity growth in 
this sector would have turned out to be much lower at an average 4.8% per anno for 
the period between the end of the year of 1993 and the end of 2000. 
In contrast to that, the structural contents calculated for Hungary, the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics are much less in line with their considerably high intensities of struc-
tural change. In the case of Hungary, industrial employment appears to have grown 
slightly more in below-average productivity branches at the expense of branches that 
achieved higher productivity levels: hence the structural content of productivity 
growth turned out to be negative. Here, specialisation in manufacturing industry had a 
dampening effect on productivity growth and with structural change having grown 
more intensive towards the end of the period of analysis, we might see a further decele-
ration-effect on productivity growth in the future. In the Czech and Slovak Republic, 
structural contents of productivity growth are rather negligible, yet positive. 
Poland and Slovenia both exhibit comparable structural contents at moderate levels. In 
line with that, both countries also share comparable intensities of structural change 
which, however, are lower than in the three afore-mentioned countries. 
With more confidence as compared to the sectoral level, we can assume that the ‘re-
mainder’ share of productivity growth, i. e. the residual growth rate after deducting the 
structural content, contains largely technological advance.14 Given this, we can assu-
me that in all countries bar Estonia, manufacturing productivity growth is overwhel-
mingly driven by technological advance. In particular, Poland and Hungary achieved 
comparable rates of growth of manufacturing productivity growth, yet Hungary can be 
expected to have experienced slightly more technological advancement as compared to 
Poland. 
                                                 
14  Obviously, there will always be some extent of structural change and hence some share of produc-
tivity growth due to structural change at every level of aggregation. A clear-cut distinction between 
this statistical effect and pure technological advance can only be drawn at the firm level. The level 
of disaggregation applied here represents the lowest level possible in terms of availability of com-
parative data. This sort of problem would also emerge in a growth accounting exercise, had it been 




4.4  The role of individual branches in manufacturing productivity 
growth 
So far, analysis could establish whether manufacturing productivity growth was rather 
of a labour-saving or labour augmenting kind, whether manufacturing productivity 
growth was subject to a large-scale reallocation of labour between industrial branches, 
and what role this inter-branch restructuring played for productivity growth. In the fol-
lowing, the analysis determines the most important of the 14 double-digit NACE ma-
nufacturing branches as a source of productivity growth. Using the same method as in 
chapter 2.4 at the sectoral level, analysis here identifies the three most influential bran-
ches as a source of manufacturing productivity growth (see table 9). 
Table 9: 
Ranking of most influential branches as a source of manufacturing productivity 
growth, between 1994/1993 and 2000/1999 
Estonia  Poland   Czech  Republic 
Branch  i π ˆ    Branch  i π ˆ    Branch  i π ˆ  
DN  18.8   DA  16.6   DM  15.9 
DD  15.6   DK  9.1   DK  15.5 
DL  10.5   DI  8.3   DJ  13.7 
Sum 3 Branches  43.9    Sum 3 Branches  34.0    Sum 3 Branches  45.1 
 
Slovak Republic    Hungary    Slovenia 
Branch  i π ˆ    Branch  i π ˆ    Branch  i π ˆ  
DM  22.8   DL  22.6  DJ  17.1 
DK  14.6   DA  14.1  DK  13.1 
DL  12.7   DM  16.6  DB  12.4 
Sum 3 Branches  50.1    Sum 3 Branches  53.3    Sum 3 Branches  42.6 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 
The most obvious result is that in each of the countries of our sample, a different 
group of industry branches appear to be at the root of the manufacturing sectors’ pro-
ductivity growth. The branches that appear most often in the list of the three most in-
fluential industries as a source of manufacturing productivity growth are in particular 
‘machinery and equipment’ (NACE: DK), ‘electrical and optical equipment’ (NACE: 
DL), and ‘transport equipment’ (NACE: DM). All those branches can be considered to 
be rather sophisticated in terms of technology, or lend themselves to swiftly grow into 




A comparable pattern of branches as sources between countries can only be found in 
the case of the Czech and Slovak Republics: in both countries, the branches of ‘trans-
port equipment’ and ‘machinery and equipment’ belong to the two most influential in-
dustries for manufacturing productivity growth. In the case of the Slovak Republic, 
however, the sum of their influences as measured by 
i π ˆ  is somewhat higher. Between 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, the two manufacturing branches of ‘machinery and 
equipment’ and ‘basic metals and fabricated metal products’ (NACE: DJ) both belong 
to the group of most influential branches for manufacturing productivity growth. 
The branch of ‘transport equipment’ also plays an important role in the case of Hun-
gary, and ‘machinery and equipment’ belongs to the three most influential branches 
for manufacturing productivity growth in Poland. The Polish and Hungary’s manufac-
turing sectors share a common branch as an influential source of industrial productivi-
ty growth, namely ‘food products, beverages and tobacco’ (NACE: DA). Another   
overlap is reported for the manufacturing branch of ‘electrical and optical equipment’ 
between the accession countries of Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Estonia. 
Apart from these few overlaps, each manufacturing industry of EU accession countries 
assessed appears to feature independent structures: as was the case in the analysis of the 
most influential sources of manufacturing productivity gaps, country-specific factors 
appear to have become by now more important for manufacturing productivity growth 
than any particular feature common to all transition economies in Central East Europe. 
The main results can be summarised per accession candidate as follows: 
Between the Estonian manufacturing branches, intensity of structural change 
was considerably larger than in all other countries of our panel, and in line with 
that, the structural content of manufacturing productivity growth also turned out 
to be considerable. In terms of branches, manufacturing productivity growth in 
Estonia was mainly driven by the country’s specialisation on wood-processing 
industries. Those industries can be assumed to lend themselves well as a core for 
a sustainable, i. e. productivity-driven, growth path in the future. 
In line with a rather small intensity of structural change between branches, the 
share of productivity growth in the Polish manufacturing sector accountable to the 
statistical effect is rather small – hence technological development (which in-
cludes labour saving productivity growth) will have been dominant in manufactur-
ing productivity growth. The most influential branch for manufacturing producti-
vity growth between 1994 and 2000 turned out to be the food processing industry, 
this in line with the country’s large agricultural sector. For the assessment of futu-
re prospects, however, this branch does not suggest the highest potentials. 
Despite the fact that the Czech manufacturing sector experienced intense struc-




productivity growth accountable to this structural change remained negligible. 
Hence, the engine of productivity growth must have been rather of a technologi-
cal kind. The group of branches most influential for the productivity growth  
achieved in the Czech manufacturing sector contains a large share of industries 
with typically higher technological sophistication. 
In line with the Slovak Republic’s rather moderate intensity of structural change 
(which however started to pick up again during the second half of the 1990), the 
structural content of manufacturing productivity growth turned out to be negligi-
ble. Productivity growth may be assumed to have been mainly achieved by way 
of technological advance. Amongst the branches most influential for the growth 
of productivity in the manufacturing sector as a whole are typically industries at 
the upper end of technological sophistication, shedding a positive light on the 
country’s future potentials for catching up. 
Hungary’s considerably intense structural change between manufacturing 
branches did not translate into an equally large share for the structural content of 
manufacturing productivity growth – rather, this content turned out to be slightly 
negative: manufacturing productivity growth would have turned out slightly 
higher, if it had not been for the rising employment in below-average productiv-
ity branches at the expense of above-average productivity branches. None of the 
productivity growth therefore is attributable to structural change, rather produc-
tivity growth was exclusively of a technological kind. This technological devel-
opment was however achieved largely in manufacturing branches which do not 
belong to the typically technology-intensive group. Future prospects therefore to 
a considerable extent depend on whether the recently considerably rising inten-
sity of structural change will in fact benefit more sophisticated branches of 
manufacturing. 
The Slovenian manufacturing sector experienced a rather low intensity of struc-
tural change within the manufacturing sector, hence the structural content of 
productivity growth is also rather moderate. Most of the productivity growth was 
therefore achieved by technological advance. The most influential branches for 
manufacturing productivity growth have so far included both more and less so-
phisticated industries, reducing the scope for targeted economic policy. 
4.5  Productivity growth potentials in the manufacturing industry 
The final chapter of this research report is devoted to an attempt to quantify future po-
tentials of real economy catching up for each EU accession state by use of the infor-
mation conveyed by economic structures. An empirical model is developed to deter-




use of experience gathered from previous cases of real economy integration in West 
and East Europe. A projection of future growth potentials can best be developed at the 
meso-level of manufacturing industry: here, patterns of specialisation can be assessed 
in terms of existing comparative advantages and we can safely assume that each 
country will retain its country-specific features into the short to medium term future. 
This is why, from a theoretical perspective, the notion of specialisation patterns and 
path depend development can be applied with much more confidence here as com-
pared to the sectoral level: depending on what resources in an economy integrating 
with another is relatively more abundant in supply (and hence available at a lower 
price), will the manufacturing industry of this economy specialise on production that 
uses this resource most intensively. Both integrating partners adjust in terms of rela-
tive sizes of manufacturing branches to match those comparative advantages. With in-
tegrating partners being able to focus on their own strengths, their aggregate produc-
tion after integration will be higher. The beneficial effects from integration will hence 
be largest, where patterns of scarcities and abundancies are most complementary, and 
hence allow a deep level of specialisation, of division of labour. 
Of course, potentials for future productivity growth depend on a multitude of factors 
existing today and evolving over time. However here, we assume that structural pat-
terns of branch-specialisation contain the necessary critical amount of information 
needed to assess manufacturing productivity catch-up. In a way, this assumption al-
lows us to use structural patterns as an umbrella, catching most of the explicit deter-
minants of productivity catch-up. In short: patterns determine prospects. The assump-
tion can be backed by a number of stylised facts: 
•  Manufacturing branches’ productivity levels not only differ across branches in 
the same country, the same branches across different countries also exhibit com-
parable deviations from the respective countries’ average: each branch typically 
uses different techniques and technologies in the production of value added that 
correspond to the respective type of product/production. Hence, in a developed 
manufacturing sector, each branch achieves a branch-specific productivity level, 
giving rise to a ‘system of relative productivity levels’. 
  In particular, both in West and East Europe, the manufacturing branches of e. g. 
‘textiles and textile products’, ‘leather and leather products’, and ‘furniture and 
recycling’ typically exhibit productivity levels well below the national average 
for total manufacturing. Branches like ‘coke, refined petroleum products and nu-
clear fuel’, ‘chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres’, and ‘transport 
equipment’ on the other end of the spectrum are typically situated at the top of 
the list of branches with respect to their relative productivity levels in total 
manufacturing. The branches listed at the bottom range of branch-specific pro-
ductivity levels are typically associated with a high labour intensity and are 




at the top of the range are typically characterised as being more technology and 
knowledge-driven. In accession countries, this categorisation was less pro-
nounced at the outset of integration, but with relative prices adjusting and due to 
the transfer from West to East of new production techniques and product tech-
nologies, the ranking of relative branch-specific productivity levels there became 
more comparable to the ranking in the West (and hence more pronounced). 
•  What is even more, this categorisation also holds in terms of growth of branch-
specific productivity levels: the group at the lower margin in accession states 
typically achieved lower rates of growth of branch-specific productivity levels, 
whereas the growth rates exhibited in the branches of the second group above 
also outperformed the average growth rate of all branches contained within the 
manufacturing sector. Apparently, some branches lend themselves better to swift 
productivity convergence than other branches. 
  In some theoretical work, the effects of particular patterns of specialisation have 
been linked to prospects for catching up development: in Snower (1994), a 
distinct specialisation on low-skill branches is shown to possibly lead into a de-
velopment trap. 
•  From the viewpoint of a manufacturing sector experiencing integration with a 
more developed economic area, the largest improvements in firm-level produc-
tivity can be expected to stem from technology transfer. This includes product 
and process technology, both in terms of technical advancement and organisa-
tional efficiency in the firm, as well as improvements in the management and 
marketing of the firm. Technology is not transferred with the same speed and to 
the same amount across different branches: the decision of a foreign investor in 
typically labour-intensive branches is based on comparatively lower labour 
costs, hence not much technology transfer is involved. The opposite applies to 
branches that are typically more demanding on the qualification of personnel: to 
operate machinery of higher technological sophistication, personnel has to sup-
ply some minimum qualification. In branches that are marketing driven, com-
petitiveness critically depends on factors other than technology. Investors in 
such branches, whether foreign or domestic, will focus on the market rather than 
the technological advancement of the production process. Again, the scope for 
technology transfer is hence limited. 
  On the contrary, in branches where competitiveness depends on sophisticated 
technology, an investor in a less developed country will strive to implement as 
much of the more developed foreign technology as the host country is able to 
absorb. Such branches will be the main channels for technology transfer, and a 
country with particularly strong investment activity in such branches can expect 
to catch up more swiftly: i. e. branches which can benefit most from technology 




ger the share of more sophisticated branches, the larger the base for productivity 
growth potentials in total manufacturing in the future. 
Of course, the notion of branch-specific productivity levels and of branch-specific po-
tentials for future productivity catch-up are assumptions that have so far not been 
tested empirically. Further support in favour of these assumptions can only be derived 
from field studies which are amongst the objectives of other research conducted in the 
project. 
Accepting those assumptions, we can, already at this high level of aggregation, gener-
ate an intuition for which accession country’s manufacturing sector could be expected 
to contain the largest potentials, hence to catch up the fastest and which might be ex-
pected to consume more time. To generate a more reliable and quantifiable picture of 
respective productivity growth potentials in manufacturing sectors of accession count-
ries, we develop a simple empirical model that essentially takes a production (supply-
side) viewpoint of manufacturing industries. The model aims to quantify the potential 
for average manufacturing productivity growth determined by the particular composi-
tion of the manufacturing sector in relative shares of individual branches (the structu-
ral pattern). 
The development of the model proceeds in two steps: first, a generalisable, nomologi-
cal rule for the relationship between patterns and prospects in manufacturing industries 
catching up via integration is set up by way of a regression analysis. Here, structural 
patterns and observed productivity growth rates are regressed in a cross-country panel 
analysis of accession states between 1994 and 1999, a period which characterises the 
time of gradual real economic integration. To add credibility to the model, further ex-
perience with real integration of Portugal, Greece and Spain was considered for the 
years between 1973 and 1985. That period corresponds to the decade or so prior to 
complete real integration, as manifested by full EU membership. Of course, the 
amount of experience considered in the development of this model is still limited, 
hence generalisability is also restricted. Moreover, our model is restricted by virtue of 
the assumptions made to manufacturing industries catching up to such industries in 
more developed or even matured market economies via real economy integration. 
In a second step, scenarios for possible future developments of structural patterns are 
projected by recourse to the resource-based view, in which integration partners tend to 
gradually specialise on production in which they can make use of comparative advan-
tages. If we are able to determine the prospects contained in past and existing structu-
res, and if we are able to project future patterns of specialisation, then this model could 
generate an idea on the prospects of manufacturing sectors of individual accession 
countries to catch up in terms of productivity (out-of-sample projection). 
The description of structural patterns therefore has to bridge a gap between two oppos-




patterns and structure-specific prospects improves in terms of robustness with falling 
levels of aggregation. The more precise the description of a manufacturing branch 
(i. e. the lower the level of aggregation), the more confidence we can have in our as-
sumption that a particular branch can be associated with branch-specific productivity 
growth potentials. Consider e. g. the two-digit manufacturing branch of ‘transport 
equipment’: it contains several heterogeneous three-digit (sub-)branches, including 
‘manufacturing of bicycles’ and ‘manufacture of aircraft’. From a production side per-
spective, it is plain to see that those two branches will contain quite different potentials 
for productivity growth. 
On the other hand, however, structural patterns at the same time have to lend them-
selves to a projection of future patterns evolving in the short to medium term. While it 
is not possible to predict with sufficient confidence the development of relative sizes 
of every 3-digit manufacturing branch, the development of sizes of classes of bran-
ches, grouped by class-criteria that correspond to the resource-based view on structural 
patterns (comparative advantages), can more robustly be projected. 
The model therefore has to strike a good balance between homogeneity on the one hand 
(low level of aggregation), and predictability of future structural patterns on the other 
hand (higher aggregation). Such balance can be found in a suitable taxonomy: the new 
WIFO-taxonomy unambiguously groups together 3-digit manufacturing branches into 
homogeneous classes: each manufacturing branch is allocated to only one class (i. e. 
classes are free from overlaps) and according to the class-criterion that is best fulfilled 
by the branch. Typically, each branch will contain some of each of the features which 
are characteristic of classes, but it forms part of the class for which the branch exhibits 
the highest proximity to the criterion (cluster analysis). This taxonomy groups manufac-
turing branches in classes of three dimensions: first, “comparative cost advantages 
stemming from exogenous and location dependent factors such as relative endowment 
with capital and labour”; and second, “firm-specific advantages stemming from targeted 
investment in intangible assets such as advertising and R&D” (Peneder, 1999, p. 10). 
The third dimension classifies industries according to labour skills (ibid., pp. 29-34). 
Amongst the most prominent features, manufacturing industries in European transition 
economies typically share a high intensity of manual work, technology gaps in terms 
of production and products, and they tend to achieve lower prices in particular for 
products which are marketing driven. The criteria used in this model hence include 
‘labour intensive’ (LI), ‘marketing intensive’ (MI), ‘technology-intensive’ (TI), and 
‘low-qualification intensive’ (lQI). The latter category is a cross-sectional one and inc-
ludes all branches which can be considered to employ mainly less qualified labour, 
and not included in either of the other classes.15 
                                                 
15  From theoretical experience, we would expect the class of ‘capital intensive’ branches to also be 




Of course, a priori, we do not know the actual sizes of class-specific productivity 
growth potentials, but intuition can lead us some way to generate hypothesis on the di-
rection of a relationship. The precise relationship is assessed in the first step of the 
model: manufacturing productivity growth is a function of the structural pattern within 
the manufacturing sector, corrected by the actual extent of backwardness. The latter is 
derived from Gerschenkron’s concept of ‘advantages of backwardness’, in which it is 
assumed that productivity growth will be faster in ‘backward’ countries than in count-
ries at the contemporary technological frontier, as here, the scope for technology trans-
fer is greater.16 
()
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This relationship is assessed by way of a cross-country pooled least squares panel re-
gression: The dependent variable, productivity growth 
i π  of the manufacturing sector 
of accession country i, is regressed against the structural pattern described by the 
shares of classes of labour intensive branches, marketing intensive branches, technol-
ogy intensive ones, and branches which are intensive in employing low-qualification 
personnel, and finally the extent of backwardness, proxied by the size of the produc-
tivity gap vis-à-vis the average EU-15. The model therefore regresses a flow variable 
against a group of stock variables. The regression was conducted in logarithmical 
form, so that the estimated β - values, corrected with the normalised productivity gap, 
can be interpreted as elasticities. The empirical form of formula 12 then reads: 
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The data used in the regression analysis include annual full-time equivalent employ-
ment shares of three digit manufacturing branches grouped in the above four classes. 
In the cases of Poland and Estonia, comparative three digit employment data was not 
available and had to be estimated by use of (incomplete) national data. In all other ac-
cession countries, comparative data was available from EUROSTAT. The sums of 
shares of all classes in respective countries amount to some 70-90 per cent of total 
manufacturing employment. The remaining employment not considered could not be 
classified into either of the four classes and are mainly employed in capital intensive 
branches. 
                                                                                                                                             
productivity growth: in the panel of EU cohesion countries, a correlation analysis suggested a 
significant positive relationship, whereas in the panel of EU accession countries this correlation 
was significantly negative. Hence, this class was not considered here. 
16  Available technology can be implemented via imitation. Backward countries have the advantage of 
being able to improve their performance without having to invest into own innovations. See Ger-
schenkron (1962), or product cycle theories. In fact, Landesmann, Stehrer (2002) find evidence for 




The annual rates of growth of manufacturing productivity and the productivity gaps 
between individual accession countries and the average EU-15 were calculated by use 
of EUROSTAT data on value added and employment in manufacturing sectors. In the 
case of productivity growth, some adjustment of data was necessary: Hungary expe-
rienced a near-crisis in 1995, the Czech Republic did in 1997. Those crises and associ-
ated reductions in value added growth (and hence also in productivity growth) are in-
dependent of structural patterns and clearly exogenous to our model. The productivity 
gap correction factor was normalised to one and takes values smaller than one for 
backward countries. 
In all accession countries, three year moving averages of data were used to iron out the 
largest fluctuations which were particularly strong for productivity growth rates. In line 
with the assumed model, the regression was restricted to estimate a common constant 
for all countries: despite possible country-specific conditions, the model is geared to-
wards determining the relationship between the structures and productivity growth of 
an integrated, yet still backward manufacturing sector regardless in which country. 
The results of the regression exercise are reported in table 10: three regressions were 
made. The first included regression all classes of manufacturing industry. It comes as 
no surprise that the a larger share of labour intensive branches is associated with lower 
labour productivity growth rates for the whole manufacturing sector; the same intui-
tion is supported by the results for marketing driven branches and low-qualification 
branches. Contrary to intuition are the results produced for technology intensive and 
high-qualification intensive branches. The results, however, also suggest that the coef-
ficients are insignificant with error probabilities exceeding the 10 per cent level, and 
hence might be considered statistically accidental. No unambiguous intuition can be 
formed with respect to capital intensive branches, including more traditional branches 
like ‘pulp, paper and paperboard’ and more sophisticated ones like ‘basic chemicals’ 
and ‘parts and accessories for motor vehicles’. The regression analysis suggests a ne-
gative association with productivity growth. Due to this and the fact that labour inten-
sity and capital intensity might economically be considered opposites (i. e. possible 
negative correlation, multicollinearity-problem), the explanatory variable of the share 
of capital intensive manufacturing branches was discarded in the subsequent regres-
sion exercises. 
In the second regression, the coefficient for the technology intensive branch-class 
turns out to be significant and bears the sign we would have expected. The class of 
high-qualification branches also received the right sign now, but remains insignificant. 
Additionally, some statistical negative correlation with low-qualification branches 
might exist in the data (which is not due to the design of the classes: not all branches 
qualify as either low or high-qualification ones due to our correction exercise to get rid 
of overlaps between classes). Overall explanatory power, measured in r-squares, 





Results of the regression analysis 
   Explanatory  variables       
  N  ln LI  ln CI  ln MI  ln TI  ln lQI  ln hQI  constant  R
2 adjust.  R
2 
1 72 -1.30*  -0.64*  -2.23* -0.21 -0.63* -0.10  16.52* 
   (-8.30)  (-7.17) (-9.93) (-1.56) (-6.51) (-1.26)  (9.40) 
0.82 0.81 
2 72 -0.52*   -1.12*  0.31*  -0.50*  0.10  6.71* 
   (-4.17)    (-6.30) (2.45) (-3.94) (1.00)  (5.65) 
0.68 0.65 
3 72 -0.39*   -1.62*  0.50*  -0.66*   8.09* 
   (-2.31)   (-5.71)  (2.96)  (-4.01)   (6.47) 
0.71 0.69 
Note: Dependent variables are in all regressions are the logs of backwardness-corrected manufacturing labour pro-
ductivity growth. Coefficients market * are significant at least at the 5 per cent error probability. T-ratios are pro-
vided in subscripted parentheses. 
 
In the third and final regression exercise, we omitted the explanatory variable of high-
qualification branches and all result are now conclusive: labour intensity, marketing 
intensity and low-qualification intensity branches are all given a negative sign, the co-
efficients are all statistically significant. The shares of technology intensive branches 
are positively associated with labour productivity growth and the coefficient for all 
countries in our panel is significant at least at the 5 per cent error probability. More-
over, the explanatory power of the regression increased slightly again and reaches a 
comfortable level around 70 per cent. 
The highest elasticity of changes to the structural pattern turn out to concern the group 
of marketing-intensive branches: if, in a given manufacturing sector, the share of such 
branches were to grow by 1 per cent, total manufacturing productivity growth would 
turn out to be 1.6 per cent lower as compared to the period before that structural chan-
ge. The lowest elasticity is recorded for labour intensive branches with 0.4. 
The first indication of the quality of the regression model is provided by a comparison 
of estimated manufacturing productivity growth rates (inner-sample) and observed va-
lues. In fact, some deviation exists: in the case of Poland and the Czech Republic, ob-
served growth rates exceed estimated rates by some 18 to 19 per cent, and in the case 
of Slovenia, the cumulated rates of growth between 1994 and 1999 calculated by use 
of the regression results exceed observed rates by some 1.7 percentage points, or some 
20 per cent. Deviations in the other countries remain much lower from 5 to 10 per 
cent. Overall, however, and when considering that the pool-regression was conducted 
between a sample of transition economies from Central East Europe and West Euro-
pean cohesion countries, the results seem robust enough to warrant further exploration. 
This allows us to use the results for the second step of the projection exercise. Future 




presents what the resource-based view on specialisation would suggest: past trends in 
structural change between the four classes are extrapolated into the future by way of a 
logarithmical trend analysis. This assumes that structural adjustment is more intense at 
the outset of integration and gradually abates with deepening real economy integra-
tion. Scenario B assumes that the patterns of specialisation as they have emerged near-
ly one decade after integration began represent final patterns – no further changes are 
made to the sizes of class shares here. 
Scenarios C and D assume structural convergence scenarios: it is perceivable that in 
line with technological catching up, the industries of accession countries will engage 
in the kind of intra-industrial trade typical for the industries of most member states.17 
In scenario C, the structural patterns of accession states by 2014 converge to the pat-
terns that prevailed in EU cohesion countries some decade after their own individual 
EU membership. This scenario is motivated by the fact that both groups of countries 
share common productivity gaps during their respective times of accession, they also 
share their main comparative advantage of lower labour (unit) costs. Finally, scenario 
D assumes that structural patterns in accession states will converge to patterns ob-
served today in Germany. Despite the fact that this last version can be held to be the 
least realistic, it does help to put the results of the other scenarios into perspective. For 
both convergence scenarios, the convergence paths were estimated by use of a poly-
nomic trend analysis to the power of three. 
Table 11 provides an overview of average rates of manufacturing productivity growth 
projected by the model in each scenario. Charts 10 to 13 plot the resulting develop-
ments of manufacturing productivity levels for each scenario in per cent levels of the 
EU-15 average (to estimate future EU-15 average manufacturing productivity levels, a 
constant annual rate of growth of 2.77 per cent was applied; this rate corresponds to 
the observed average growth rate in the period 1994 to 1999). 
The most important results to be highlighted pertain to scenario A, because, according 
to the resource-based concept, this is the most likely outcome of structural adjustment. 
If structural trends of the past were to persist into the short to medium term future, 
then Poland is projected to achieve the lowest manufacturing productivity growth with 
on average 3 per cent over the period 2000 to 2014. The Slovak manufacturing sector 
on the other extreme is projected to achieve the highest productivity growth rates av-
eraging 8.4 per cent per year. In the framework of our model, we can conclude that the 
potentials for catching up in terms of manufacturing productivity are lowest for Poland 
and highest for the Slovak Republic. Prospects in Estonia with projected annual 
                                                 
17  For an assessment of structures in trade between the industries of EU accession and members 
states, refer to Gabrisch, Segnana (2001). The results however do not suggest structural conver-
gence. Rather, a distinct pattern of vertical intra-industrial trade emerging between East and West 
would indicate the emergence of distinct specialisation patterns across the criterion of product 




growth rates of some 4 per cent are only slightly better than in Poland, catching up 
would still be extremely slow considering that the manufacturing productivity level of 
the EU-15 average is a moving target with assumed growth rates of 2.8 per cent per 
year. The Czech Republic is projected to catch up with annual average rates of 5.8 per 
cent, and Hungary and Slovenia with annual rates averaging some 6.6 per cent. 
Table 11: 
Projected manufacturing productivity growth rates in accession candidates, between 
2000 and 2014 
  Scenario A  Scenario B  Scenario C  Scenario D 
Estonia  4.0 3.7 3.9 8.4 
Poland  3.0 3.3 3.5 7.5 
Czech  Republic  5.8 5.5 4.1 7.7 
Slovak  Republic  8.4 7.0 4.7 8.4 
Hungary  6.6 5.6 4.2 7.8 
Slovenia  6.6 6.0 4.2 7.2 
EU-15  2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
 
In terms of potentials of catching up to EU-15 levels, the model suggests that the Slo-
vak Republic could reach 75 per cent of the EU-15 average manufacturing productiv-
ity level as early as by the year of 2007 (see chart 10). Because Slovenia already  
achieved the highest productivity levels, growth rates of only 6.6 per cent per year 
would suffice to let the country’s manufacturing sector catch up to 75 per cent of the 
EU-15 average already by 2005. Hungary is projected to reach that threshold some 
time around 2011 and the Czech Republic around 2014. Prospects for catching up as 
projected by our model are bleak for Poland and Estonia. 
The comparison of results for scenarios A and B provides another interesting insights: 
were structures to remain at their patterns of 1999, then our model would actually pro-
ject slightly higher growth rates in Poland as compared to the scenario in which past 
structural change describes a trend into the future. In fact, this would suggest that 
structural adjustment in Poland appears to, in our model, dampen future prospects of 
the country to see its manufacturing sector catch up in terms of productivity. For all 
other countries, assumed future structural adjustments in manufacturing sectors result 
in our model in accelerating productivity growth rates: here, the direction of structural 
adjustment so far improved the countries’ prospects for high future productivity 
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Chart 11: 
Projected development of productivity gaps in scenario B in per cent of the average 
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Scenario A: trends in specialisation 
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Projected development of productivity gaps in scenario D in per cent of the average 
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Scenario C: structural convergence to patterns in EU cohesion countries 




Between all scenarios, projected growth rates are highest in the ‘convergence to Ger-
many’ scenario D. This is not surprising, because in particular technology-intensive 
branches exhibit much smaller shares in accession countries as compared to the Ger-
man pattern: the shares of technology intensive branches would grow at the expense of 
all other branches, in particular low qualification branches. Only in the case of the Slo-
vak Republic are rates for scenario D not higher than in other scenarios, which is of 
course due to the fact that past trends let structural patterns in the Slovak Republic 
come closer to the ones in Germany, extrapolation of past trends already describes a 
path of structural convergence. The countries that would benefit most in terms of our 
model here from structures converging to such in Germany would be Estonia and Po-
land. In both countries, the projected rates of manufacturing productivity growth 
would more than double in size. Subsequently, projected trajectories of productivities 
in accession candidates allow much faster closure of gaps in this scenario: all acces-
sion candidates of our sample are projected here to exceed the 75 per cent threshold 
within our period of analysis. All countries assessed with the notable exception of Es-
tonia are projected to catch up completely by 2020, Estonia only a couple of years 
later. 
Also of little surprise are the results for scenario C, the ‘convergence to cohesion 
countries’ scenario: all countries (bar Poland) are projected to achieve lower rates of 
manufacturing productivity growth if structural patterns of today were to converge to 
patterns that prevailed in EU cohesion countries some decade after their own individ-
ual membership in the European Union. Apparently, structural patterns in accession 
candidates are already, in terms of our model, more preferable than in cohesion coun-
tries after most profound structural adjustments via integration were complete there. 
Only in the case of Poland would a delinearisation of structural patterns to the ones in 
EU cohesion countries lead to higher projected growth rates. The projected develop-
ment of productivity gaps in chart 12 hence imply stagnation for all countries except 
for Estonia and Poland, where some moderate catching up could till take place. 
4.6  Economic policy considerations of results 
Manufacturing productivity growth was so far mostly a result of a reduced allocation 
of labour, i. e. falling employment. This was particularly pronounced in the cases of 
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. This development reflects a necessary pro-
cess of adjustment to intensified competition not only at the firm level (reduction of 
overmanning). In particular in the two latter accession countries, manufacturing sec-
tors employ a significantly larger share of total employment in comparison to the ave-
rage EU-15. This also applies to the Slovak Republic, albeit here, the labour saving ef-




Labour saving productivity growth alone, however, may not provide a sufficient basis 
for a sustainable process of catching up. Rather, with a view on the typically leading 
role of manufacturing industries for technological development in other sectors of the 
economy, with a view on the comparative advantage of significantly lower labour  
(unit) costs in EU accession states vis-à-vis most EU member states, and not least with 
a view on high unemployment levels, productivity growth will have to exceed the la-
bour saving effect at some point of time to allow a swift process of catching up in the 
manufacturing sectors. 
Hence, the aim of economic policy could be directed towards improving the condi-
tions for firms to grow sufficiently competitive to increase overall employment. By 
that way, either competitive firms increase their personnel or new firms emerge, em-
ploying additional labour. Due to intensifying specialisation in the course of integra-
tion, employment growth will tend to be biased in those branches where the country 
has the largest comparative advantages. While it is best left to the market mechanism 
to determine the ‘winning’ branches and the firms in them, our analysis was able to 
pinpoint in some countries specific branches which appear to contain more potentials 
for future catch up than others. At least for the medium term, they can be expected to 
remain valid. Each accession country would benefit most if policy would be directed 
at their country-specific peculiarities. Our analysis did show that common features, 
e. g. such inherited from their socialist past play a less important role. 
The structure within Estonia’s manufacturing sector would suggest that the wood-
processing industry is amongst the most important branches with respect to future pro-
ductivity growth: a process of particularly intense structural change has singled out 
those branches as positive specialisation branches vis-à-vis Germany. In addition, those 
branches belong to the most influential ones as sources of manufacturing productivity 
growth, yet productivity gaps in those branches are still considerable. 
A path of economic development in manufacturing which focuses mainly on the struc-
tures as they have emerged today, however, could result in comparatively low potentials 
for future productivity growth – this result is suggested by our model in chapter 4.5.  
Economic policy could hence support further structural change, possibly allowing ad-
ditional specialisation-industries to emerge. 
The large Polish food-processing industry does not really suggest itself to economic 
policy assistance, but some intervention in terms of economic structures could prove 
to be very effective here. After all, structural change within the manufacturing sector 
was not very intense so far. However, the manufacturing industry of the country does 
also exhibit a considerable positive specialisation towards the textile manufacturing 
branch. Here, improvements in the efficiency of labour intensive production techni-
ques could further increase competitiveness (a considerably gap still exists, however, 




industry even lends itself to technological development as experience from Italy tea-
ches. 
Next to the focus on those two branches, our manufacturing productivity growth-
projecting empirical model strongly suggests that future prospects for a swift process 
of catching up are not the brightest, and some further structural change could improve 
potentials. However, past trends in specialisation already served to worsen the pros-
pects as indicated by the model. This points attention to a possible danger: specialisa-
tion patterns in the Polish manufacturing sector might lock the country into a sustained 
productivity gap, and breaking up that deadlock would necessitate profound structural 
change into a particular direction – possibly against the market trend. The scope for 
economic policy in this respect is very limited indeed, and interventions will probably 
only be successful if sufficient proximity to trends provided by the market mecha-
nisms can be found. Typically, intervention could then take the form of support for 
technological development, as R&D, technology-intensive FDI, investment-support, 
etc. 
In the past, the Czech and Slovak Republics’ manufacturing productivity growth pat-
terns were mostly influenced by mechanical engineering branches with considerable 
technological sophistication. However, specialisation patterns rather favoured less so-
phisticated industries in the manufacturing sectors of both countries, amongst which 
are the textile industry and manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products. The inten-
sities of structural change between manufacturing industries have been considerable 
mainly at the outset of economic transition, this in particular applies to the Czech Re-
public. For economic policy, this would indicate that some structural policy in support 
of adjustment to more sophisticated industry branches could further improve 
prospects. 
The results of the empirical model, however, suggest that the manufacturing industry 
of in particular for the Slovak Republic appears to be very well suited to promise a 
swift process of catching up. In respect to potentials for future manufacturing produc-
tivity growth in the Slovak Republic therefore, no need for political intervention as 
such appears to be advisable. Rather, the usual technological support measures could 
apply. In the case of the Czech Republic, however, the model presents a different pic-
ture: prospects as projected by the model are not bleak, but clearly less favourable than 
in the Slovak Republic. Hence, some structural policy in the Czech manufacturing sec-
tor in support of more sophisticated industry branches could further improve 
prospects. 
The analysis for Hungary is less clear cut, specialisation patterns favour rather less so-
phisticated branches like textiles and non-metallic mineral products, yet manufacturing 
productivity growth was mainly driven by electrical and mechanical engineering in-
dustries. Also structural change was significant and is clearly rising again in the more 




The results of the projections model suggest that the manufacturing sector’s structural 
pattern is well suited for a swift process of catching up, yet prospects are not as bright 
as e. g. in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic. The results of the model also clearly 
show that the direction of the lately renewed intensity of structural change in the Hun-
garian manufacturing sector does improve its potentials for future productivity growth. 
Hence, there appears to be little scope for economic policy intervention apart from the 
generally applicable support for technological development. 
The pattern of specialisation in the Slovenian manufacturing sector and its structural 
development path do not contain obvious shortcomings: intensity of structural change 
was low, productivity growth so far was probably dominated by technological ad-
vancement, and specialisation patterns include a mix of more and less sophisticated 
branches. 
The empirical model also suggests that prospects for future productivity growth and 
catch up to standards in the West look very bright. Even more pronounced than in the 
case of Hungary, our analysis suggests that there appears to be very limited scope for 
economic policy intervention in the Slovenian manufacturing industry. Rather, support 
of further technological advance could speed up a process which appears to be well 




Summary of main results 
The objective of this research was to uncover the role played by specialisation patterns 
for the explanation of observed labour productivity gaps between CEECs and the ave-
rage EU. Derived from this, the analysis attempted to determine the potentials of each 
of the six accession candidates for closing the productivity gap, given their respective 
patterns and trends of specialisation. This assessment was divided in four categories, 
in sectoral and industrial branch-level specialisation patterns and in such patterns as 
determinants of productivity gaps and growth. 
With respect to the sectoral patterns of specialisation, our analysis established that in 
some accession countries, national productivity gaps can be explained by differing 
sectoral structures: in the cases of the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Re-
public, and possibly Poland, a significant share of the national productivity gaps root 
in a pure statistical effect of larger shares of employment in sectors that exhibit lower 
levels of sector-specific productivity levels. Furthermore, in the Slovak Republic, Po-
land and Slovenia, this ‘sectoral content’ even grew larger since the early years of 
transformation. With these trends solidifying, those countries will sustain national pro-
ductivity gaps of up to one-fifth of the average EU-15 level even after all their firms 
have completely caught-up in terms of firm-specific productivity levels. Only in Hun-
gary and the Czech Republic did this sectoral content show a falling trend. 
In all accession countries assessed, the sectors of manufacturing industry play the larg-
est role as a source of national productivity gaps: this results from a combination of 
first large shares in terms of employment and second large sector-specific productivity 
gaps. Only in the case of Poland did the large employment share and the vast produc-
tivity gap in the agricultural sector result in this sector assuming a more important role 
even than manufacturing industries. Here, however, problems with the statistical raw 
data could drive that result. 
The assessment of productivity growth at the national level could establish at produc-
tivity growth often resulted from a downward adjustment of employment – labour-
saving technological change or the reduction of historical overmanning to sustain in-
tensifying competition via integration: whereas Poland, the Czech and Slovak Repub-
lics were able to increase productivity and employment levels simultaneously during 
the initial years of systemic transformation and economic integration with the West, 
this proved to be not sustainable. In the years following, employment adjusted down-
wards. Only in the cases of Hungary and Slovenia did employment numbers adjust 
during the early years, to allow simultaneous employment and productivity growth 
thereafter. In Estonia, the assessment turned out to produce a significant negative cor-
relation between employment figures and productivity levels for the total period  be-




The second source of productivity growth assessed here pertains to structural change: 
with employment shifting from one sector of the economy to another, national produc-
tivity levels (calculated as weighted averages) might also change: productivity levels 
are not employment-specific but rather sector-specific. In fact, in all countries assessed 
here bar Poland, some of the national productivity growth can be traced back to em-
ployment shifts between sectors: in the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, and in 
Hungary, the share of productivity growth accountable to this statistical effect amounts 
to between 20 and 30 per cent. , in the case of Estonia and Slovenia to roughly 15 per 
cent. In all countries, the most important sectoral source of productivity growth per-
tains to manufacturing industries again. Hence, from our sectoral analysis, we are 
pointed to the manufacturing sector as potentially the most important sector in terms 
of determinants of productivity levels and growth. This warrants our focus on the 
manufacturing sector in the second part of the analysis. 
First, we could establish that unlike at the national levels, manufacturing sectors’ pro-
ductivity gaps are on average less intensively determined by differing structural pat-
terns. The shares of productivity gaps accountable to the countries’ particular speciali-
sation patterns within manufacturing sectors are highest for Slovenia and Hungary 
with values of the ‘structural contents’ of some 12 per cent. In the cases of the Slovak 
Republic and Hungary, those shares have risen considerably since the early years of 
transition and integration. If one were to assume that those trends depict evolving spe-
cialisation patterns in the course of intensifying integration, then one could conclude 
that those countries might run into some form of ‘barrier’ to complete closure of the 
productivity gap: rather, specialisation patterns could ‘lock’ those countries into a dis-
advantaging position vis-à-vis the EU. Within the manufacturing sectors, all countries 
exhibit differing structures: despite the fact that all countries share the common com-
parative advantage vis-à-vis the EU of lower labour (unit) costs, it is the technologi-
cally more sophisticated industrial branches of machinery, electrical equipment and 
the like that play a leading source of manufacturing productivity gaps in the cases of 
Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics. In the cases of Estonia, Hungary and possi-
bly Poland, the largest shares of the productivity gaps are accountable to the industrial 
branches with a close proximity to agriculture (food, beverages and tobacco) and to 
labour-intensive production (textiles). 
Again compared to the national level, manufacturing sectors’ productivity growth 
more often than not resulted from a downward adjustment of employment figures: the 
co-existence of productivity and employment growth during the initial years proved to 
be unsustainable where that occurred. Only in the case of Hungary did employment in 
manufacturing start to grow simultaneously with productivity levels during the more 
recent past. In Slovenia, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, the correlation between em-
ployment growth and productivity growth even amounts to nearly minus one. On this 
level of aggregation, the share of inter-branch restructuring in manufacturing produc-




employment restructuring (i. e. exclusive the closure of productivity gaps at the firm-
level) amount to a considerable share only in the Estonian case; in Hungary, manufac-
turing productivity growth would have even turned out to be higher, if not for the rise 
in the structural content of the productivity gap at the manufacturing level. The most 
important manufacturing branches as sources of productivity growth of the total manu-
facturing sector turned out to be very different across the countries assessed. The most 
frequently appearing branches pertain to particularly technology-intensive industries 
as e. g. machinery, electrical and optical equipment, and transport equipment. Only in 
the cases of Poland and Hungary do agricultural manufacturing sectors play a signifi-
cant role. 
In a final analysis, we attempt to quantify the potentials of productivity growth in the 
manufacturing sectors of the countries assessed here: assuming some path dependency 
in economic development, we assess the contemporary patterns of specialisation, 
trends in the past and attempt to model some scenarios of future trends of specialisa-
tion. In a simple empirical deductive model, our out-of-sample projections for future 
manufacturing productivity growth suggest: 
•  the manufacturing sector of the Slovak Republic is probably best suited for a swift 
process of productivity catch-up if we assume path dependency in the development 
of specialisation patterns; Estonia and Poland are projected to lag considerably be-
hind that development; 
•  if we were to assume structural convergence with currently weakest EU member 
states, i. e. the EU cohesion countries, only Poland and Estonia are projected to 
gain somewhat wile all other countries would achieve much lower rates of produc-
tivity growth; 
•  if accession countries’ manufacturing industries were to converge to specialisation 
patterns as they exist today in Germany, all countries are projected to achieve much 
higher productivity growth rates than in any other scenario. 
Those results suggest that structural patterns are in fact relevant for the potentials of 
countries to catch up in terms of productivity levels. And this result is very intuitive, 
yet so far under-researched: some sectors or industrial branches lend themselves better 
for a swift process of economic catch-up development than others. Some accession 
countries (e. g. the Slovak Republic, Slovenia) appear to be better suited for fast catch 
up, whilst others (e. g. Estonia, Poland) might well need a much longer period to close 
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Annex Table 1: 
Sectoral productivity levels in Estonia, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices-  
NACE   Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A  Agriculture, hunting  
and forestry  6.2  7.2 10.0 11.0 14.2 14.0 17.0 19.4 
B  Fishing  2.2 2.8 6.7 8.0 8.7  10.6  12.5  12.2 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  9.9 10.7 15.4 16.1 20.2 16.3 16.6 17.4 
D  Manufacturing  7.5  8.8  9.1  9.9 13.1 14.9 15.3 17.7 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  11.8 11.2 21.2 22.7 20.9 22.2 24.4 28.6 
F  Construction  7.5  8.4 14.1 14.6 13.8 15.8 17.3 19.5 
G 
Wholesale and resale 
trade; repair of motor ve-
hicles, motorcycles  
and personal and house-
hold goods 
12.6 11.6 16.9 18.4 17.4 18.3 20.1 22.2 
H  Hotels  and  restaurants  4.9 4.2 5.4 6.5 9.0 9.8 9.6 9.3 
I  Transport, storage and 
communication  12.6 13.1 13.5 15.4 22.6 27.1 29.1 36.3 
J  Financial  intermediation  25.7 26.8 43.3 66.3 58.4 46.8 53.4 68.3 
K  Real estate, renting and 
business activities  15.9 18.5 25.1 27.3 31.0 31.6 33.5 34.9 
L 
Public administration and 
defence; compulsory  
social security 
5.9  8.2 11.5 12.3 14.0 13.3 17.1 17.5 
M  Education  6.9 7.8 9.2 9.1 9.8  10.8  14.7  16.1 
N  Health  and  social  work  3.2  5.0  9.5 10.7 11.2 11.6 14.6 16.1 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
9.4 11.6 19.4 20.2 15.5 17.5 18.3 19.8 
  Total (sum of all sectors 
of the economy)  8.5  9.5 12.9 14.3 16.1 17.5 19.7 20.5 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 2: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in Estonia, in 1000 PPP-EUR 
- current prices - 
NACE   Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA  Manufacture of food products, 
beverages and tobacco  17.2 17.3 15.9 16.0 20.6 21.3 20.0 22.2 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  3.7 4.3 5.7 6.8 8.5 9.4 9.7  11.4 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  4.4 4.8 4.8 5.9 7.8 8.9  10.8  12.0 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  5.7  6.2  7.6  8.7 11.3 14.6 15.8 20.3 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products; publishing 
and printing 
6.8  7.0  9.8 10.8 14.3 17.9 20.8 22.5 
DF+ 
DG 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and  
nuclear fuel, of chemicals, 
chemical products and  
man-made fibres 
9.5 14.8 14.7 13.7 17.8 19.3 28.9 34.8 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  5.4  8.3 10.8 10.9 19.9 18.5 18.1 22.2 
DI  Manufacture of other  
non-metallic mineral products  8.3 10.1  8.7  9.7 14.9 18.5 21.4 23.2 
DJ  Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal products  7.4  7.1  7.4  9.3 11.9 16.0 13.7 17.6 
DK  Manufacture of machinery  
and equipment n.e.c.  2.6 4.4 4.4 5.8 7.0 8.4 8.6  12.7 
DL  Manufacture of electrical  
and optical equipment  4.7 4.0 4.9 5.8 9.1  14.0  14.0  14.8 
DM  Manufacture of transport  
equipment  13.3  9.8  8.2  9.5 12.8 13.8 17.1 19.9 
DN  Manufacturing  n.e.c.  3.3  6.3  6.7  7.4 10.3 11.3 12.9 14.5 
  Total  manufacturing  7.5  8.8  9.1  9.9 13.1 14.9 15.3 17.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 3: 
Sectoral productivity levels in Poland, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE  Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A  Agriculture, hunting  
and forestry  3.2 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.5 2.6 
B  Fishing  7.5 8.4 7.6 7.8 7.6 7.3  10.3 9.3 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  17.6 23.0 24.5 25.4 26.9 25.4 28.6 36.8 
D  Manufacturing  13.4 13.8 16.1 16.2 17.4 18.3 20.1 23.0 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  29.5 27.7 30.9 33.2 32.7 33.8 38.2 41.1 
F  Construction  18.4 17.8 18.6 19.5 20.8 24.3 26.8 30.5 
G 
Wholesale and resale  
trade; repair of motor  
vehicles, motorcycles  
and personal and  
household goods 
19.7 19.5 22.2 25.1 25.3 25.9 27.4 30.0 
H  Hotels  and  restaurants  9.3 10.3 10.2 12.3 13.0 13.5 16.2 16.7 
I  Transport, storage  
and communication  15.3 16.7 16.6 17.7 18.5 19.6 22.5 26.2 
J  Financial  intermediation  5.0 8.2 7.7 8.3  11.2  12.8  15.5  22.9 
K  Real estate, renting  
and business activities  22.6 28.3 31.3 33.2 34.9 41.0 42.4 45.5 
L 
Public administration  
and defence; compulsory 
social security 
29.4 24.5 30.6 32.4 31.0 32.7 31.8 32.0 
M  Education  7.0  8.0  9.6 10.3 11.8 12.3 13.6 15.3 
N  Health and social work  7.8  7.6  8.6  9.2  10.0  10.2  11.4  11.5 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
20.1 22.6 24.6 25.1 25.2 29.9 29.2 30.9 
  Total (sum of all sectors  
of the economy)  12.3 12.6 14.0 14.7 15.5 16.6 17.7 19.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 4: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in Poland, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE  Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA  Manufacture of food prod-
ucts, beverages and tobacco  15.1 12.8 16.8 15.8 18.0 18.1 19.4 23.0 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  8.9 8.7 9.1 9.0 9.5  10.1  11.4  10.9 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  7.7 9.0 8.8 9.5 8.0 8.5  13.9  11.2 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  10.7 14.4 13.0 13.5 14.7 14.7 15.3 19.1 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products;  
publishing and printing 
18.2 21.3 29.5 26.9 25.3 26.5 30.2 36.2 
DF 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and  
nuclear fuel 
54.0 49.7 49.7 34.1 54.4 61.3 48.7 111.
2 
DG 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products and  
man-made fibres 
21.4 22.7 30.2 29.5 31.0 32.9 35.5 39.0 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  18.4 18.6 22.1 20.6 21.6 22.1 23.9 26.1 
DI 
Manufacture of other  
non-metallic mineral  
products 
12.1 14.6 15.4 16.9 17.6 19.7 21.4 26.8 
DJ 
Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal  
products 
13.5 15.0 17.6 17.2 18.7 19.8 20.0 22.6 
DK  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  11.3 11.9 14.1 15.7 16.4 16.1 17.8 20.5 
DL  Manufacture of electrical  
and optical equipment  14.3 13.6 17.1 20.0 21.2 23.1 28.6 27.7 
DM  Manufacture of transport  
equipment  13.0 14.3 14.3 16.9 16.8 18.9 18.1 23.4 
DN Manufacturing  n.e.c.  11.1  11.8 12.5 12.2 14.6 14.4 16.7 17.0 
 Total  manufacturing  13.4  13.8 16.1 16.2 17.4 18.3 20.1 23.0 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 5: 
Sectoral productivity levels in the Czech Republic, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE   Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A+B  Agriculture, hunting and 
forestry, and fishing  13.5 14.6 15.7 18.1 18.2 20.4 20.2 22.5 
B  Fishing  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  21.2 22.2 24.6 32.2 25.4 22.8 23.3 24.6 
D  Manufacturing  16.2 17.8 19.9 22.7 24.0 23.5 24.0 26.5 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  58.2 60.3 54.0 66.1 51.1 50.4 57.6 64.2 
F  Construction  17.6 16.3 20.7 18.9 19.4 17.9 19.4 20.4 
G 
Wholesale and resale  
trade; repair of motor  
vehicles, motorcycles  
and personal and  
household goods 
21.9 19.1 20.2 18.4 23.3 25.5 26.7 29.4 
H  Hotels  and  restaurants  12.4 17.6 25.3 21.8 15.1 12.8 15.2 18.2 
I  Transport, storage  
and communication  21.3 22.6 23.2 22.7 25.0 26.0 25.9 27.5 
J  Financial  intermediation  90.5 71.1 56.2 47.7 44.3 62.6 59.3 57.1 
K  Real estate, renting  
and business activities  51.9 50.9 51.5 52.1 52.9 56.9 56.2 57.6 
L 
Public administration  
and defence; compulsory 
social security 
13.6 13.0 15.8 17.3 19.9 19.6 19.5 19.5 
M  Education  9.2 11.1 11.6 13.1 12.6 12.1 14.7 14.9 
N  Health  and  social  work  10.3 12.2 13.2 14.2 14.8 14.7 15.3 15.4 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
14.7 16.5 17.9 19.9 19.4 17.5 19.4 19.5 
  Total (sum of all sectors  
of the economy)  19.8 20.1 22.0 22.5 23.7 24.2 25.1 26.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 6: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in the Czech Republic, in 1000 PPP-EUR 
- current prices - 
NACE  Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA 
Manufacture of food  
products, beverages  
and tobacco 
25.8 30.4 27.6 27.4 26.4 26.5 29.1 33.8 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  10.6  8.9 11.7 12.9 14.0 13.8 13.2 15.1 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  8.8 10.7 11.1 12.5  8.6 10.1 12.4 15.0 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  26.5 26.1 15.9 16.3 20.1 18.2 21.1 24.5 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products;  
publishing and printing 
29.4 25.1 28.8 25.6 28.5 27.3 30.4 32.3 
DF 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and  
nuclear fuel 
44.6 49.3 66.8 20.0 77.0 92.3 73.1 79.6 
DG 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products and  
man-made fibres 
20.3 21.5 27.7 37.4 41.0 40.2 40.3 46.1 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  14.8 13.7 19.4 23.4 29.8 27.4 29.7 30.3 
DI 
Manufacture of other  
non-metallic mineral  
products 
18.6 17.7 23.6 27.3 30.4 29.6 32.3 35.7 
DJ  Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal products  19.7 20.0 21.2 20.6 23.4 22.4 20.5 23.6 
DK  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  12.3 12.1 15.5 16.3 20.5 20.3 19.3 22.2 
DL  Manufacture of electrical  
and optical equipment  12.8 11.1 16.2 17.8 23.3 21.6 20.9 20.6 
DM  Manufacture of transport  
equipment  13.3 13.6 18.4 22.6 31.4 30.8 33.6 35.0 
DN Manufacturing  n.e.c.  12.1  12.6 16.9 17.7 17.8 17.4 18.3 19.6 
 Total  manufacturing  16.2  17.8 19.9 22.7 24.0 23.5 24.0 26.5 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 7: 
Sectoral productivity levels in the Slovak Republic, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE  Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A+B  Agriculture, hunting  
and forestry, and fishing  7.0 11.2 12.4 12.3 13.3 14.6 15.3 18.1 
B  Fishing  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  11.8 12.4 14.7 12.7 10.3 12.4 14.7 18.4 
D  Manufacturing  11.7 14.3 19.3 18.6 19.2 19.7 22.4 22.7 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  67.3 68.3 43.4 35.4 33.6 32.4 42.6 42.7 
F Construction  8.5  11.5  11.3 17.3 17.1 17.3 14.9 17.2 
G 
Wholesale and resale  
trade; repair of motor  
vehicles, motorcycles  
and personal and  
household goods 
31.3 27.7 22.9 24.4 23.5 26.4 28.4 32.2 
H Hotels  and  restaurants  13.8  10.3 5.9 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.5 
I  Transport, storage  
and communication  16.5 23.9 25.6 27.7 32.6 32.2 33.5 35.1 
J Financial  intermediation  119.6  103.9 90.7 66.0  107.6 78.2 74.2 58.6 
K  Real estate, renting  
and business activities  21.1 27.8 42.7 50.5 69.9 72.7 80.5 80.5 
L 
Public administration  
and defence; compulsory 
social security 
13.4  9.2 16.4 16.9 19.7 20.6 20.3 19.3 
M Education  8.5  8.5  12.3 12.6 16.3 17.1 16.3 16.9 
N  Health  and  social  work  4.4 3.6 4.1 4.9 7.0 7.8 7.1 7.5 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
7.8 11.5  6.1  6.3  8.1 10.1 11.5 13.6 
  Total (sum of all sectors 
of the economy)  15.2 16.8 18.7 19.1 21.2 22.2 23.6 24.9 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 8: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in the Slovak Republic, in 1000 PPP-EUR 
- current prices - 
NACE   Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA 
Manufacture of food  
products, beverages  
and tobacco 
19.2 22.4 27.6 26.6 26.4 25.2 26.5 24.4 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  5.3 6.0 6.8 6.1 5.9 5.6 6.1 5.1 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  5.0 5.3 6.3 5.8 4.8 6.2 6.9 6.5 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  6.8  7.7 11.1 10.2 10.7  9.4 11.6 11.8 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products;  
publishing and printing 
13.1 17.4 25.5 23.6 24.5 24.9 27.5 27.2 
DF 
Manufacture of coke,  
refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel 
67.3  89.2 117.3 126.6 137.9 111.8 142.6 216.3 
DG 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products and 
man-made fibres 
17.5 22.3 32.7 30.7 28.8 25.5 28.4 29.3 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  15.6 18.2 25.6 24.5 25.5 21.3 23.3 23.9 
DI 
Manufacture of other 
non-metallic mineral  
products 
9.3 10.8 14.4 14.2 14.7 15.8 17.9 16.9 
DJ 
Manufacture of basic  
metals and fabricated metal 
products 
19.3 23.1 30.7 25.2 25.9 24.8 29.1 26.1 
DK  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  5.8 6.7 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.6  11.5  12.3 
DL  Manufacture of electrical 
and optical equipment  7.3  9.0 11.4 12.1 13.7 15.0 15.2 14.4 
DM  Manufacture of transport 
equipment  8.9 13.0 24.3 26.2 28.5 49.8 58.9 59.6 
DN Manufacturing  n.e.c.  7.4 8.6 12.1 12.2 11.9 11.5 14.2 14.5 
 Total  manufacturing  11.7  14.3 19.3 18.6 19.2 19.7 22.4 22.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 9: 
Sectoral productivity levels in Hungary, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE   Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A+B  Agriculture, hunting  
and forestry, and fishing  12.8 14.6 17.1 16.9 17.0 17.5 16.7 16.9 
B  Fishing  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  10.2  9.3 10.2 10.0 13.7 10.8 10.9 14.1 
D  Manufacturing  15.8 17.4 19.8 20.3 23.0 23.2 23.5 26.7 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  25.2 21.2 25.5 29.3 32.3 35.1 40.4 45.0 
F  Construction  17.2 18.3 15.9 15.2 17.4 17.5 17.1 17.3 
G 
Wholesale and resale  
trade; repair of motor  
vehicles, motorcycles  
and personal and  
household goods 
16.1 16.4 18.4 17.9 19.2 21.6 19.8 20.2 
H  Hotels  and  restaurants  12.3 12.1 12.8 13.4 13.7 12.9 12.5 13.1 
I  Transport, storage and 
communication  17.9 19.4 21.0 22.0 26.2 28.7 30.5 30.8 
J  Financial  intermediation  42.9 61.4 47.7 47.7 45.2 44.6 45.5 47.1 
K  Real estate, renting  
and business activities  64.0 76.4 81.9 95.6 83.2 81.1 81.4 82.3 
L 
Public administration  
and defence; compulsory 
social security 
16.8 16.6 16.7 17.3 19.7 21.5 22.4 23.7 
M  Education  10.8 12.0 11.4 11.0 12.9 13.3 14.5 14.7 
N  Health  and  social  work  13.1 14.5 15.0 15.4 16.0 16.4 17.4 18.8 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
13.9 15.0 14.2 15.2 14.8 14.9 17.7 18.2 
  Total (sum of all sectors  
of the economy)  17.5 19.1 20.3 21.1 22.8 23.8 24.4 26.0 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 10: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in Hungary, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE   Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA 
Manufacture of food  
products, beverages  
and tobacco 
15.8 16.5 17.5 18.6 19.5 19.0 18.3 22.6 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  8.3 8.6 9.9 9.6 9.9 9.7  10.2  10.7 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  7.6 9.7 9.1 8.7 8.6 8.5 9.3  10.1 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  17.1 19.3 21.4 20.5 21.1 19.7 17.5 17.2 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products;  
publishing and printing 
19.9 23.4 23.8 26.5 33.2 35.0 28.9 29.9 
DF 
Manufacture of coke, refined 
petroleum products and  
nuclear fuel 
74.1 62.6 64.3 62.8 81.6 79.7 99.9 88.7 
DG 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products and  
man-made fibres 
21.6 26.8 33.2 29.7 38.1 38.8 40.4 51.9 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  17.7 19.9 22.9 23.7 23.5 22.9 23.1 24.8 
DI 
Manufacture of other  
non-metallic mineral  
products 
14.4 18.4 20.7 19.6 20.8 22.2 24.6 29.5 
DJ  Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal products  12.0 14.5 19.4 19.7 20.3 23.2 19.4 24.0 
DK  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  13.2 13.7 16.8 17.3 20.3 18.8 20.2 21.8 
DL  Manufacture of electrical  
and optical equipment  14.8 18.6 18.5 22.8 26.0 25.5 25.6 30.1 
DM  Manufacture of transport  
equipment  14.6 19.2 27.5 30.3 38.0 41.4 52.1 56.6 
DN Manufacturing  n.e.c.  13.7  14.8 15.1 14.8 16.9 16.4 14.4 15.2 
 Total  manufacturing  15.8  17.4 19.8 20.3 23.0 23.2 23.5 26.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 11: 
Sectoral productivity levels in Slovenia, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE   Sector  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
A  Agriculture, hunting  
and forestry  14.4 14.9 17.3 19.6 19.0 19.1 18.5 18.7 
B  Fishing  10.3  6.9 10.0 10.4 14.2 14.3 20.5 20.4 
C  Mining  and  Quarring  21.5 24.3 23.7 28.3 38.7 39.6 41.0 46.8 
D  Manufacturing  17.1 19.6 20.3 22.1 24.3 25.9 27.7 30.3 
E  Electricity, gas and  
water supply  37.8 42.7 42.1 42.3 51.2 66.9 65.1 73.6 
F  Construction  18.2 17.6 19.4 21.8 21.1 22.3 24.7 25.1 
G 
Wholesale and resale  
trade; repair of motor  
vehicles, motorcycles  
and personal and  
household goods 
19.4 20.8 22.1 22.1 23.5 24.5 25.8 27.1 
H  Hotels  and  restaurants  18.0 16.3 17.3 18.1 19.4 19.6 21.2 23.6 
I  Transport, storage  
and communication  26.0 27.7 29.4 30.9 37.4 39.8 41.9 43.6 
J  Financial  intermediation  41.6 35.5 44.7 49.5 51.7 52.0 55.5 60.6 
K  Real estate, renting  
and business activities  47.6 49.3 51.5 52.8 51.8 53.4 55.6 58.0 
L 
Public administration 
and defence; compulsory 
social security 
21.3 22.8 25.8 26.5 33.6 33.5 34.1 36.1 
M  Education  20.0 21.4 23.5 23.8 25.3 25.3 26.5 29.4 
N  Health  and  social  work  21.3 22.9 24.3 25.6 25.7 25.8 26.3 28.1 
O 
Other community, social 
and personal service  
activities 
30.6 24.5 23.2 25.3 25.7 27.1 28.1 30.6 
  Total (sum of all sectors  
of the economy)  21.2 22.6 24.1 25.7 27.7 29.0 30.5 32.7 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 




Annex Table 12: 
Manufacturing branches productivity levels in Slovenia, in 1000 PPP-EUR  
- current prices - 
NACE   Manufacturing  branch  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DA 
Manufacture of food  
products, beverages  
and tobacco 
34.9 37.3 36.8 40.2 40.6 42.3 45.0 44.6 
DB  Manufacture of textiles  
and textile products  8.3  9.8  9.6  9.9 11.4 13.0 13.8 13.2 
DC  Manufacture of leather  
and leather products  11.6 14.1 12.1 11.5 12.4 10.7 12.7 17.1 
DD  Manufacture of wood  
and wood products  12.8 16.1 16.7 17.2 16.0 17.7 17.8 18.6 
DE 
Manufacture of pulp, paper 
and paper products;  
publishing and printing 
18.1 22.7 26.2 25.2 28.2 29.9 31.4 37.9 
DF 
Manufacture of coke,  
refined petroleum products 
and nuclear fuel 
103.6 83.6  134.1  118.4  161.5 53.4 38.6 42.6 
DG 
Manufacture of chemicals, 
chemical products and  
man-made fibres 
40.3 37.6 37.0 42.9 47.7 48.2 52.1 58.3 
DH  Manufacture of rubber  
and plastic products  21.4 22.9 22.6 24.0 23.6 21.2 25.6 27.7 
DI 
Manufacture of other  
non-metallic mineral  
products 
16.8 18.3 15.8 18.9 22.9 24.4 27.6 28.4 
DJ 
Manufacture of basic metals 
and fabricated metal  
products 
14.0 15.4 19.2 19.2 20.1 20.9 23.0 27.2 
DK  Manufacture of machinery 
and equipment n.e.c.  13.8 20.8 18.7 19.4 24.7 26.0 28.6 32.0 
DL  Manufacture of electrical 
and optical equipment  12.7 14.6 15.0 17.4 20.2 21.0 21.2 23.4 
DM  Manufacture of transport 
equipment  26.2 28.0 31.8 39.7 49.7 64.0 62.4 73.8 
DN  Manufacturing  n.e.c.  15.1 20.2 17.2 19.1 18.1 20.4 24.5 23.6 
  Total  manufacturing  17.1 19.6 20.3 22.1 24.3 25.9 27.7 30.3 
Note: Productivity levels are calculated as value added per full-time equivalent employment. 
Sources:  EUROSTAT; WIIW; National Statistical Offices; own calculations. 